Detection rules › Splunk
AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally
The following analytic detects when an EC2 snapshot is shared with an external AWS account by analyzing AWS CloudTrail events. This detection method leverages CloudTrail logs to identify modifications in snapshot permissions, specifically when the snapshot is shared outside the originating AWS account. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data stored in the snapshot. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the snapshot's data, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the compromised information.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Exfiltration | T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- ASL AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally (Splunk)
- AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Access Removed (Elastic)
- AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Shared or Made Public (Elastic)
- AWS Snapshot Made Public (Panther)
Rule body splunk
name: AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally
id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-07-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects when an EC2 snapshot is shared with an external AWS account by analyzing AWS CloudTrail events. This detection method leverages CloudTrail logs to identify modifications in snapshot permissions, specifically when the snapshot is shared outside the originating AWS account. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive data stored in the snapshot. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the snapshot's data, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the compromised information.
data_source:
- AWS CloudTrail ModifySnapshotAttribute
search: |-
`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute
| rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id
| search requested_account_id != NULL
| eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,"Match","No Match")
| where match = "No Match"
| rename user_name as user
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY signature dest user
user_agent src vendor_account
vendor_region vendor_product requested_account_id
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `aws_ec2_snapshot_shared_externally_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
known_false_positives: It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for a specific purpose.
references:
- https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/
- https://stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/AWS/aws.exfiltration.ec2-share-ebs-snapshot/
- https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/enumeration/loot_public_ebs_snapshots/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: AWS EC2 snapshot from account $vendor_account$ is shared with $requested_account_id$ by user $user$ from $src$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: src
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities
- Data Exfiltration
asset_type: EC2 Snapshot
mitre_attack_id:
- T1537
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1537/aws_snapshot_exfil/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
source: aws_cloudtrail
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute
Stage 2: rename
| rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id
Stage 3: search
| search requested_account_id != NULL
Stage 4: eval
| eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,"Match","No Match")
match ="Match""No Match"Stage 5: where
| where match = "No Match"
Stage 6: rename
| rename user_name as user
Stage 7: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY signature dest user
user_agent src vendor_account
vendor_region vendor_product requested_account_id
Stage 8: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 9: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 10: search
| `aws_ec2_snapshot_shared_externally_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
eventName | eq |
|
match | eq |
|
requested_account_id | ne |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|