Detection rules › Splunk

AWS UpdateLoginProfile

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
aws::awsRegion, aws::recipientAccountId, aws::userAgent, dest, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author
Bhavin Patel, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects an AWS CloudTrail event where a user with permissions updates the login profile of another user. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify instances where the user making the change is different from the user whose profile is being updated. This activity is significant because it can indicate privilege escalation attempts, where an attacker uses a compromised account to gain higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate their privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over sensitive resources within the AWS environment.

Known false positives

  • While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Persistence

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: AWS UpdateLoginProfile
id: 2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111
version: 14
creation_date: '2021-03-02'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects an AWS CloudTrail event where a user with permissions updates the login profile of another user. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify instances where the user making the change is different from the user whose profile is being updated. This activity is significant because it can indicate privilege escalation attempts, where an attacker uses a compromised account to gain higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate their privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over sensitive resources within the AWS environment.
data_source:
    - AWS CloudTrail UpdateLoginProfile
search: |-
    `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
      | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0)
      | search match=0
      | rename user_name as user
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY signature dest user
           user_agent src vendor_account
           vendor_region vendor_product
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
references:
    - https://bishopfox.com/blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws
    - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/
finding:
    title: From IP address $src$, user agent $user_agent$ has trigged an event UpdateLoginProfile for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user$ more access privilleges
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: src
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
asset_type: AWS Account
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1136.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success

Stage 2: eval

| eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0)
match =
1.1
-0(default)

Stage 3: search

| search match=0

Stage 4: rename

| rename user_name as user

Stage 5: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY signature dest user
       user_agent src vendor_account
       vendor_region vendor_product

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 8: search

| `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.