Detection rules › Splunk

Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
aws::recipientAccountId, aws::userAgent, dest, initiatedBy, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Application Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory events, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.

Known false positives

  • Administrators may legitimately assign the Application Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
AzureAdd member to role

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned
id: eac4de87-7a56-4538-a21b-277897af6d8d
version: 15
creation_date: '2023-04-25'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Application Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory events, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory Add member to role
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Add member to role"  "properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue"="*Application Administrator*"
      | rename properties.* as *
      | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy, userAgent as user_agent
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest user src
           vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
           user_agent signature
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `azure_ad_application_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the Auditlog log category
known_false_positives: Administrators may legitimately assign the Application Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://dirkjanm.io/azure-ad-privilege-escalation-application-admin/
    - https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/concept-understand-roles
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/permissions-reference#application-administrator
finding:
    title: The privileged Azure AD role Application Administrator was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Add member to role"  "properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue"="*Application Administrator*"

Stage 2: rename

| rename properties.* as *

Stage 3: rename

| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy, userAgent as user_agent

Stage 4: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 5: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest user src
       vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
       user_agent signature

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 8: search

| `azure_ad_application_administrator_role_assigned_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.