Detection rules › Splunk
Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned
The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Application Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory events, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.
Known false positives
- Administrators may legitimately assign the Application Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | Add member to role |
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- [Entra ID] Application Assigned Administrator Permissions Immediately After Obtaining Role Management Permissions (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Mass Privileged Role Change Activity Detected (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privilege Elevation Request Denied (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privileged Role Assigned to a New User (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privileged Role Assigned to User (Kusto)
- Account Elevated to New Role (Kusto)
- Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant (Kusto)
- App Assigned To Azure RBAC/Microsoft Entra Role (Sigma)
Rule body
name: Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned
id: eac4de87-7a56-4538-a21b-277897af6d8d
version: 15
creation_date: '2023-04-25'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Application Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory events, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant because users in this role can manage all aspects of enterprise applications, including credentials, which can be used to impersonate application identities. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could escalate privileges, manage application settings, and potentially access sensitive resources by impersonating application identities, posing a significant security risk to the Azure AD tenant.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory Add member to role
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" "properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue"="*Application Administrator*"
| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy, userAgent as user_agent
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
user_agent signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_application_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the Auditlog log category
known_false_positives: Administrators may legitimately assign the Application Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://dirkjanm.io/azure-ad-privilege-escalation-application-admin/
- https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/concept-understand-roles
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/permissions-reference#application-administrator
finding:
title: The privileged Azure AD role Application Administrator was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" "properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue"="*Application Administrator*"
Stage 2: rename
| rename properties.* as *
Stage 3: rename
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy, userAgent as user_agent
Stage 4: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
user_agent signature
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `azure_ad_application_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
operationName | eq |
| field:"operationName" kind:eq |
properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue | eq |
| field:"properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue" kind:eq |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"azure:monitor:aad" |