Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled

Status: production
Severity: medium
Group by: aws::recipientAccountId, aws::userAgent, dest, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source: github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects when the risk-based step-up consent security setting in Azure AD is disabled. It monitors Azure Active Directory logs for the "Update authorization policy" operation, specifically changes to the "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps" setting. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats by allowing users to grant consent to potentially malicious applications. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to user data and sensitive information, leading to data breaches and further compromise within the organization.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Defense Impairment	`T1685` Disable or Modify Tools

Rule body splunk

name: Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled
id: 875de3d7-09bc-4916-8c0a-0929f4ced3d8
version: 13
creation_date: '2023-11-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects when the risk-based step-up consent security setting in Azure AD is disabled. It monitors Azure Active Directory logs for the "Update authorization policy" operation, specifically changes to the "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps" setting. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats by allowing users to grant consent to potentially malicious applications. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to user data and sensitive information, leading to data breaches and further compromise within the organization.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory Update authorization policy
search: "`azure_monitor_aad` operationName=\"Update authorization policy\" | rename properties.* as * | eval index_number = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName',\"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName',\"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps\"), -1) | search index_number >= 0 | eval AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',index_number) | search AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = \"[true]\" | rename userAgent as user_agent | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent signature | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_block_user_consent_for_risky_apps_disabled_filter`"
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLog log category.
known_false_positives: Legitimate changes to the 'risk-based step-up consent' setting by administrators, perhaps as part of a policy update or security assessment, may trigger this alert, necessitating verification of the change's intent and authorization
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
    - https://goodworkaround.com/2020/10/19/a-look-behind-the-azure-ad-permission-classifications-preview/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/enterprise-apps/configure-risk-based-step-up-consent
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/investigate-risky-oauth
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: User $user$ disabled the BlockUserConsentForRiskyApps Azure AD setting.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Account Takeover
asset_type: Azure Tenant
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1685
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: identity
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562/azuread_disable_blockconsent_for_riskapps/azuread_disable_blockconsent_for_riskapps.log
          source: Azure Ad
          sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Update authorization policy"

Stage 2: `rename`

| rename properties.* as *

Stage 3: `eval`

| eval index_number = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName',"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName',"AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps"), -1)

Stage 4: `search`

| search index_number >= 0

Stage 5: `eval`

| eval AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',index_number)

Stage 6: `search`

| search AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = "[true]"

Stage 7: `rename`

| rename userAgent as user_agent

Stage 8: `fillnull`

| fillnull

Stage 9: `stats`

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent signature

Stage 10: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 11: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 12: `search`

| `azure_ad_block_user_consent_for_risky_apps_disabled_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps`	eq	`"[true]"`
`index_number`	ge	`0`
`operationName`	eq	`"Update authorization policy"`
`sourcetype`	eq	`azure:monitor:aad`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body splunk

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `rename`

Stage 3: `eval`

Stage 4: `search`

Stage 5: `eval`

Stage 6: `search`

Stage 7: `rename`

Stage 8: `fillnull`

Stage 9: `stats`

Stage 10: `search`

Stage 11: `search`

Stage 12: `search`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body splunk

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

Stage 2: rename

Stage 3: eval

Stage 4: search

Stage 5: eval

Stage 6: search

Stage 7: rename

Stage 8: fillnull

Stage 9: stats

Stage 10: search

Stage 11: search

Stage 12: search

Indicators

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `rename`

Stage 3: `eval`

Stage 4: `search`

Stage 5: `eval`

Stage 6: `search`

Stage 7: `rename`

Stage 8: `fillnull`

Stage 9: `stats`

Stage 10: `search`

Stage 11: `search`

Stage 12: `search`