Detection rules › Splunk

Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
aws::recipientAccountId, aws::userAgent, dest, initiatedBy, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author
Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify when the "Add member to role" operation includes the "Global Administrator" role. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.

Known false positives

  • Administrators may legitimately assign the Global Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
AzureAdd member to role

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
id: 825fed20-309d-4fd1-8aaf-cd49c1bb093c
version: 15
creation_date: '2022-08-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify when the "Add member to role" operation includes the "Global Administrator" role. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory Add member to role
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue="*Global Administrator*"
      | rename properties.* as *
      | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
      | rename userAgent as user_agent
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest user src
           vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
           initiatedBy signature
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: Administrators may legitimately assign the Global Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/post/admin/
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=4277
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/security-planning
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
finding:
    title: Global Administrator Role assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
    entity:
        field: initiatedBy
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
          message: Global Administrator Role assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Persistence
    - Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue="*Global Administrator*"

Stage 2: rename

| rename properties.* as *

Stage 3: rename

| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy

Stage 4: rename

| rename userAgent as user_agent

Stage 5: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 6: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest user src
       vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
       initiatedBy signature

Stage 7: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 8: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 9: search

| `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.