Detection rules › Splunk
Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
The following analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify when the "Add member to role" operation includes the "Global Administrator" role. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.
Known false positives
- Administrators may legitimately assign the Global Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | Add member to role |
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- [Entra ID] Application Assigned Administrator Permissions Immediately After Obtaining Role Management Permissions (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Mass Privileged Role Change Activity Detected (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privilege Elevation Request Denied (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privileged Role Assigned to a New User (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Privileged Role Assigned to User (Kusto)
- Account Elevated to New Role (Kusto)
- Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant (Kusto)
- App Assigned To Azure RBAC/Microsoft Entra Role (Sigma)
Rule body
name: Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned
id: 825fed20-309d-4fd1-8aaf-cd49c1bb093c
version: 15
creation_date: '2022-08-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify when the "Add member to role" operation includes the "Global Administrator" role. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory Add member to role
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue="*Global Administrator*"
| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename userAgent as user_agent
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
initiatedBy signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: Administrators may legitimately assign the Global Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://o365blog.com/post/admin/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=4277
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/security-planning
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/elevate-access-global-admin
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
finding:
title: Global Administrator Role assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
entity:
field: initiatedBy
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
message: Global Administrator Role assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue="*Global Administrator*"
Stage 2: rename
| rename properties.* as *
Stage 3: rename
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
Stage 4: rename
| rename userAgent as user_agent
Stage 5: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 6: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
initiatedBy signature
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 9: search
| `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
operationName | eq |
| field:"operationName" kind:eq |
properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue | eq |
| field:"properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue" kind:eq |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"azure:monitor:aad" |