Detection rules › Splunk

Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
aws::recipientAccountId, aws::userAgent, dest, initiatedBy, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Disable Strong Authentication" operation. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow adversaries to maintain persistence using compromised accounts without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass an essential security control, potentially leading to unauthorized access and prolonged undetected presence in the environment.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate use case may require for users to disable MFA. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
AzureDisable Strong Authentication

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled
id: 482dd42a-acfa-486b-a0bb-d6fcda27318e
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-08-10'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Disable Strong Authentication" operation. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow adversaries to maintain persistence using compromised accounts without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass an essential security control, potentially leading to unauthorized access and prolonged undetected presence in the environment.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory Disable Strong Authentication
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Disable Strong Authentication"
      | rename properties.* as *
      | rename targetResources{}.type as type
      | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
      | rename userAgent as user_agent
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest user src
           vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
           initiatedBy signature
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `azure_ad_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: Legitimate use case may require for users to disable MFA. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/concept-mfa-howitworks
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates
    - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
finding:
    title: MFA disabled for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Account Takeover
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1556.006
    - T1586.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: identity

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Disable Strong Authentication"

Stage 2: rename

| rename properties.* as *

Stage 3: rename

| rename targetResources{}.type as type

Stage 4: rename

| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy

Stage 5: rename

| rename userAgent as user_agent

Stage 6: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 7: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest user src
       vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
       initiatedBy signature

Stage 8: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 9: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 10: search

| `azure_ad_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.