Detection rules › Splunk
Azure AD New Custom Domain Added
The following analytic detects the addition of a new custom domain within an Azure Active Directory (AD) tenant. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify successful "Add unverified domain" operations. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence by setting up identity federation backdoors, allowing them to impersonate users and bypass authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access to the Azure AD environment, posing a severe security risk.
Known false positives
- In most organizations, new customm domains will be updated infrequently. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | Add unverified domain |
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- [Entra ID] Domain Federation Trust Settings Modified (Kusto)
- Azure AD New Federated Domain Added (Splunk)
- Azure Domain Federation Settings Modified (Sigma)
- Entra ID Custom Domain Added or Verified (Elastic)
- Entra ID Domain Federation Configuration Change (Elastic)
- Modified domain federation trust settings (Kusto)
- New onmicrosoft domain added to tenant (Kusto)
- New Root Certificate Authority Added (Sigma)
Rule body
name: Azure AD New Custom Domain Added
id: 30c47f45-dd6a-4720-9963-0bca6c8686ef
version: 13
creation_date: '2022-09-02'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the addition of a new custom domain within an Azure Active Directory (AD) tenant. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify successful "Add unverified domain" operations. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence by setting up identity federation backdoors, allowing them to impersonate users and bypass authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access to the Azure AD environment, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory Add unverified domain
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add unverified domain" properties.result=success
| rename properties.* as *
| rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain
| rename userAgent as user_agent
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
domain signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_new_custom_domain_added_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: In most organizations, new customm domains will be updated infrequently. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/enterprise-users/domains-manage
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-microsoft-365-defend-against-apt29-v13
- https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/
- https://www.inversecos.com/2021/11/how-to-detect-azure-active-directory.html
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002/
finding:
title: A new custom domain, $domain$ , was added by $user$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1484.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add unverified domain" properties.result=success
Stage 2: rename
| rename properties.* as *
Stage 3: rename
| rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain
Stage 4: rename
| rename userAgent as user_agent
Stage 5: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 6: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
domain signature
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 9: search
| `azure_ad_new_custom_domain_added_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
operationName | eq |
| field:"operationName" kind:eq |
properties.result | eq |
| field:"properties.result" kind:eq value:"success" |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"azure:monitor:aad" |