Detection rules › Splunk

Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
aws::recipientAccountId, dest, initiatedBy, result, role, signature, src, user, vendor_product
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged Azure Active Directory roles to a user. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant as adversaries may assign privileged roles to compromised accounts to maintain persistence within the Azure AD environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain long-term control over the Azure AD infrastructure.

Known false positives

  • Administrators will legitimately assign the privileged roles users as part of administrative tasks. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
AzureAdd member to role

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned
id: a28f0bc3-3400-4a6e-a2da-89b9e95f0d2a
version: 16
creation_date: '2022-08-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged Azure Active Directory roles to a user. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant as adversaries may assign privileged roles to compromised accounts to maintain persistence within the Azure AD environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain long-term control over the Azure AD infrastructure.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory Add member to role
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_aad` "operationName"="Add member to role"
      | rename properties.* as *
      | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
      | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles
      | eval role=mvindex(roles,1)
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest user src
           vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
           result role signature
      | lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description
      | search isprvilegedadrole = True
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLog log category.
known_false_positives: Administrators will legitimately assign the privileged roles users as part of administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/concept-understand-roles
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/permissions-reference
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=4277
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/detecting-microsoft-365-azure-active-directory-backdoors
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/security-planning
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
finding:
    title: A privileged Azure AD role was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
    entity:
        field: initiatedBy
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
          message: A privileged Azure AD role was assigned for User $user$ initiated by $initiatedBy$
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Persistence
    - NOBELIUM Group
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
    - Storm-0501 Ransomware
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: audit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`azure_monitor_aad` "operationName"="Add member to role"

Stage 2: rename

| rename properties.* as *

Stage 3: rename

| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy

Stage 4: rename

| rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles

Stage 5: eval

| eval role=mvindex(roles,1)

Stage 6: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 7: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest user src
       vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
       result role signature

Stage 8: lookup

| lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description
Lookup table
privileged_azure_ad_roles
Key field
azureadrole as role
Output columns
['isprvilegedadrole', 'isprvilegedadrole'], ['description', 'description']

Stage 9: search

| search isprvilegedadrole = True

Stage 10: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 11: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 12: search

| `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.