Detection rules › Splunk
Azure AD Service Principal Created
The following analytic detects the creation of a Service Principal in an Azure AD environment. It leverages Azure Active Directory events ingested through EventHub, specifically monitoring the "Add service principal" operation. This activity is significant because Service Principals can be used by adversaries to establish persistence and bypass multi-factor authentication and conditional access policies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain single-factor access to the Azure AD environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access to resources and prolonged undetected activity.
Known false positives
- Administrator may legitimately create Service Principal. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | Add service principal |
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- [Entra ID] Application Assigned Administrator Permissions Immediately After Obtaining Role Management Permissions (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Application Granted Administrative Permission to Assign Microsoft Entra ID Roles (Kusto)
- Added Credentials to Existing Application (Sigma)
- Added Owner To Application (Sigma)
- Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant (Kusto)
- App Granted Microsoft Permissions (Sigma)
- App Granted Privileged Delegated Or App Permissions (Sigma)
- Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes (Sigma)
Rule body
name: Azure AD Service Principal Created
id: f8ba49e7-ffd3-4b53-8f61-e73974583c5d
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-08-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a Service Principal in an Azure AD environment. It leverages Azure Active Directory events ingested through EventHub, specifically monitoring the "Add service principal" operation. This activity is significant because Service Principals can be used by adversaries to establish persistence and bypass multi-factor authentication and conditional access policies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain single-factor access to the Azure AD environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access to resources and prolonged undetected activity.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory Add service principal
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add service principal" properties.initiatedBy.user.id=*
| rename properties.* as *
| rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName
| rename targetResources{}.type as type
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product displayName
result signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_service_principal_created_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment thorough an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLog log category.
known_false_positives: Administrator may legitimately create Service Principal. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/app-objects-and-service-principals
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/azure/create-azure-service-principal-azureps?view=azps-8.2.0
- https://www.truesec.com/hub/blog/using-a-legitimate-application-to-create-persistence-and-initiate-email-campaigns
- https://www.inversecos.com/2021/10/how-to-backdoor-azure-applications-and.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
finding:
title: Service Principal named $displayName$ created by $user$
entity:
field: displayName
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
- NOBELIUM Group
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1136.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add service principal" properties.initiatedBy.user.id=*
Stage 2: rename
| rename properties.* as *
Stage 3: rename
| rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName
Stage 4: rename
| rename targetResources{}.type as type
Stage 5: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 6: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product displayName
result signature
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 9: search
| `azure_ad_service_principal_created_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
operationName | eq |
| field:"operationName" kind:eq |
properties.initiatedBy.user.id | eq |
| field:"properties.initiatedBy.user.id" kind:eq value:"*" |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"azure:monitor:aad" |