Detection rules › Splunk
Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials
The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials to Service Principals and Applications in Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs, specifically monitoring the "Update application*Certificates and secrets management" operation. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the Azure environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these new credentials to log in as the service principal, potentially compromising sensitive accounts and resources, leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure environment.
Known false positives
- Service Principal client credential modifications may be part of legitimate administrative operations. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | any: Entra ID audit event (any operation) |
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
Rule body
name: Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials
id: e3adc0d3-9e4b-4b5d-b662-12cec1adff2a
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-08-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials to Service Principals and Applications in Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs, specifically monitoring the "Update application*Certificates and secrets management" operation. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the Azure environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these new credentials to log in as the service principal, potentially compromising sensitive accounts and resources, leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure environment.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Update application*Certificates and secrets management "
| rename properties.* as *
| rename targetResources{}.* as *
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product modifiedProperties{}.newValue
signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the Signin log category.
known_false_positives: Service Principal client credential modifications may be part of legitimate administrative operations. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
- https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/Persistence/AZT501/AZT501-2/
- https://hausec.com/2021/10/26/attacking-azure-azure-ad-part-ii/
- https://www.inversecos.com/2021/10/how-to-backdoor-azure-applications-and.html
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft
- https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/PrivilegeEscalation/AZT405/AZT405-3/
finding:
title: New credentials added for Service Principal by $user$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- NOBELIUM Group
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: threat
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Update application*Certificates and secrets management "
Stage 2: rename
| rename properties.* as *
Stage 3: rename
| rename targetResources{}.* as *
Stage 4: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product modifiedProperties{}.newValue
signature
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `azure_ad_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
category | eq |
| field:"category" kind:eq value:"AuditLogs" |
operationName | eq |
| field:"operationName" kind:eq |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"azure:monitor:aad" |