Detection rules › Splunk
Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added
The following analytic detects the addition of a new owner to a Service Principal within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure Active Directory events from the AuditLog log category to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because Service Principals do not support multi-factor authentication or conditional access policies, making them a target for adversaries seeking persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain access to the Azure AD environment with single-factor authentication, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical resources.
Known false positives
- Administrator may legitimately add new owners for Service Principals. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Azure | Add owner to application |
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- [Entra ID] Application Assigned Administrator Permissions Immediately After Obtaining Role Management Permissions (Kusto)
- [Entra ID] Application Granted Administrative Permission to Assign Microsoft Entra ID Roles (Kusto)
- Added Credentials to Existing Application (Sigma)
- Added Owner To Application (Sigma)
- Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant (Kusto)
- App Granted Microsoft Permissions (Sigma)
- App Granted Privileged Delegated Or App Permissions (Sigma)
- Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes (Sigma)
Rule body
name: Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added
id: 7ddf2084-6cf3-4a44-be83-474f7b73c701
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-08-30'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the addition of a new owner to a Service Principal within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure Active Directory events from the AuditLog log category to identify this activity. This behavior is significant because Service Principals do not support multi-factor authentication or conditional access policies, making them a target for adversaries seeking persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain access to the Azure AD environment with single-factor authentication, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical resources.
data_source:
- Azure Active Directory Add owner to application
search: |-
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add owner to application"
| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as newOwner
| rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as displayName
| eval displayName = mvindex(displayName,1)
| where initiatedBy!=newOwner
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
result newOwner displayName
signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_service_principal_owner_added_filter`
how_to_implement: You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLog log category.
known_false_positives: Administrator may legitimately add new owners for Service Principals. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
finding:
title: A new owner was added for service principal $displayName$ by $initiatedBy$
entity:
field: initiatedBy
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: displayName
type: user
score: 50
message: A new owner was added for service principal $displayName$ by $initiatedBy$
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- NOBELIUM Group
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: audit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add owner to application"
Stage 2: rename
| rename properties.* as *
Stage 3: rename
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
Stage 4: rename
| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as newOwner
Stage 5: rename
| rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as displayName
Stage 6: eval
| eval displayName = mvindex(displayName,1)
Stage 7: where
| where initiatedBy!=newOwner
Stage 8: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 9: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src
vendor_account vendor_product initiatedBy
result newOwner displayName
signature
Stage 10: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 11: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 12: search
| `azure_ad_service_principal_owner_added_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
initiatedBy | cross_field_compare |
| field:"initiatedBy" kind:cross_field_compare value:"newOwner" |
operationName | eq |
| field:"operationName" kind:eq |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"azure:monitor:aad" |