Detection rules › Splunk

Browser Started with Remote Debugging - Windows (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Threat actors may abuse browser remote debugging features to extract sensitive data, maintain access, or facilitate communication with C2 servers. This is typically done by launching the browser with specific remote debugging flags, allowing remote access to browser sessions and potentially bypassing traditional security controls. This use case detects instances where a browser is started in remote debugging mode.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
CollectionT1185 Browser Session Hijacking

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

id: '44220.86860'
title: Browser Started with Remote Debugging - Windows
description: Threat actors may abuse browser remote debugging features to extract
  sensitive data, maintain access, or facilitate communication with C2 servers. This
  is typically done by launching the browser with specific remote debugging flags,
  allowing remote access to browser sessions and potentially bypassing traditional
  security controls. This use case detects instances where a browser is started in
  remote debugging mode.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: ' `get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) (TERM(Firefox) " -start-debugger-service") OR
  " --remote-debugging-" | where match(process, "(?i)\s+--remote-debugging-\S+") or
  (process="firefox.exe" and match(process, "(?i)\s+-start-debugger-service")) | table
  _time, host, user, process, parent_process_name, process_path | bin span=1s | stats
  values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- collection:browser session hijacking
technique_id: 
- T1185
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://yoroi.company/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/EternityGroup_report_compressed.pdf
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/analysing-lastpass-part-1/
- https://github.com/defaultnamehere/cookie_crimes/
- https://github.com/wunderwuzzi23/firefox-cookiemonster
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/ai-assisted-fake-github-repositories.html
- https://cyble.com/blog/fake-coding-challenges-steal-sensitive-data-via-fogdoor/
- https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_remote_debugging/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) (TERM(Firefox) " -start-debugger-service") OR " --remote-debugging-"

Stage 2: where

| where match(process, "(?i)\s+--remote-debugging-\S+") or (process="firefox.exe" and match(process, "(?i)\s+-start-debugger-service"))

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user, process, parent_process_name, process_path

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4688 corpus 313 (splunk 283, kusto 30)
processeq
  • "firefox.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
processmatch
  • "(?i)\s+--remote-debugging-\S+" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
  • "(?i)\s+-start-debugger-service" corpus 2 (splunk 2)

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

StageTerm
1TERM
1"<EventID>4688<"
1TERM
1Firefox
1" -start-debugger-service"
1" --remote-debugging-"