Detection rules › Splunk

Bypass or Unrestricted PowerShell Execution (PowerShell)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

This use case identifies instances where PowerShell is executed with specific, potentially insecure execution policies such as Unrestricted, Bypass, or RemoteSigned. Threat actors may exploit these settings to execute malicious scripts or commands, as they allow scripts to run without the usual restrictions and without requiring digital signatures

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '22489.40177'
title: Bypass or Unrestricted PowerShell Execution
description: 'This use case identifies instances where PowerShell is executed with
  specific, potentially insecure execution policies such as Unrestricted, Bypass,
  or RemoteSigned. Threat actors may exploit these settings to execute malicious scripts
  or commands, as they allow scripts to run without the usual restrictions and without
  requiring digital signatures. -- Threat Actor Association: UNC4990 - Software Association:
  Rhysida'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR
  "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") (" -ExecutionPolicy
  " OR " -ep " OR " -exec ") ("Unrestricted" OR "bypass" OR "RemoteSigned") | where
  not match(process, "(?i):\x5c(Program\sFiles|ProgramData|AppData\x5cRoaming\x5cCode\x5c)")
  | table _time, host, user process, process_*, signature_id | bin span=1s | stats
  values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:command and scripting interpreter:powershell
technique_id:
- T1059.001
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/01/from-zero-to-domain-admin/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2604
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_execution_policies?view=powershell-7.1

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") (" -ExecutionPolicy " OR " -ep " OR " -exec ") ("Unrestricted" OR "bypass" OR "RemoteSigned")

Stage 2: where

| where not match(process, "(?i):\x5c(Program\sFiles|ProgramData|AppData\x5cRoaming\x5cCode\x5c)")

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user process, process_*, signature_id

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
processregex_match"(?i):\x5c(Program\sFiles|ProgramData|AppData\x5cRoaming\x5cCode\x5c)"excludes:process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4103 corpus 105 (splunk 105)
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4103<"
1"<EventID>4104<"
1" -ExecutionPolicy "
1" -ep "
1" -exec "
1"Unrestricted"
1"bypass"
1"RemoteSigned"