Detection rules › Splunk
Cisco NVM - Suspicious Network Connection From Process With No Args
This analytic detects system binaries that are commonly abused in process injection techniques but are observed without any command-line arguments. It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled. Binaries such as rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, dllhost.exe, svchost.exe, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution. When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate potential injection and communication with a command and control server.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1055 Process Injection |
| Stealth | T1055 Process Injection, T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution |
Rule body splunk
name: Cisco NVM - Suspicious Network Connection From Process With No Args
id: 54fa06c5-96a2-4406-a4a7-44d93ddbd173
version: 6
creation_date: '2025-07-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
This analytic detects system binaries that are commonly abused in process injection techniques but are observed without any command-line arguments.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
Binaries such as `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `dllhost.exe`, `svchost.exe`, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution.
When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate
potential injection and communication with a command and control server.
data_source:
- Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |
`cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`
process_name IN (
"backgroundtaskhost.exe", "svchost.exe", "dllhost.exe", "werfault.exe",
"searchprotocolhost.exe", "wuauclt.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "rundll32.exe",
"regasm.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "regsvcs.exe"
)
NOT process_arguments="*"
NOT dest IN (
"10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
"127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
"192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
"192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
"198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1"
)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
values(parent_process_arguments) as parent_process_arguments
values(process_arguments) as process_arguments
values(parent_process_hash) as parent_process_hash
values(process_hash) as process_hash
values(module_name_list) as module_name_list
values(module_hash_list) as module_hash_list
values(dest_port) as dest_port
values(aliul) as additional_logged_in_users_list
values(dest_hostname) as dest_hostname
by src dest parent_process_path parent_process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_integrity_level process_id transport
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| table
parent_process_integrity_level parent_process_path parent_process_arguments parent_process_hash
process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_arguments process_hash process_id
additional_logged_in_users_list module_name_list module_hash_list
src dest_hostname dest dest_port transport firstTime lastTime
| `cisco_nvm___suspicious_network_connection_from_process_with_no_args_filter`
how_to_implement: |
This search requires Network Visibility Module logs, which includes the flow data sourcetype.
This search uses an input macro named `cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`.
We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
(index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Cisco Network Visibility Module logs.
Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.
The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
The logs are to be ingested using the Splunk Add-on for Cisco Endpoint Security Analytics (CESA) (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4221).
known_false_positives: |
Some system binaries may execute without arguments in rare legitimate scenarios (e.g., certain service launches), and initiate
a network connection to microsoft servers for telemetry or update purposes. Apply additional filters as needed.
However, binaries such as `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` running with no command-line context are highly suspicious and warrant investigation.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/process-injection/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$src$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search src = "$src$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: src
type: system
score: 20
message: The $process_name$ was seen on host $src$ executing without any command-line arguments and initiating a network connection towards $dest$. This might indicate a potential communication with a C&C server.
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1055
- T1218
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test - Cisco NVM
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_network_visibility_module/cisco_nvm_flowdata/nvm_flowdata.log
source: not_applicable
sourcetype: cisco:nvm:flowdata
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`
process_name IN (
"backgroundtaskhost.exe", "svchost.exe", "dllhost.exe", "werfault.exe",
"searchprotocolhost.exe", "wuauclt.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "rundll32.exe",
"regasm.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "regsvcs.exe"
)
NOT process_arguments="*"
NOT dest IN (
"10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
"127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
"192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
"192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
"198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1"
)
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
values(parent_process_arguments) as parent_process_arguments
values(process_arguments) as process_arguments
values(parent_process_hash) as parent_process_hash
values(process_hash) as process_hash
values(module_name_list) as module_name_list
values(module_hash_list) as module_hash_list
values(dest_port) as dest_port
values(aliul) as additional_logged_in_users_list
values(dest_hostname) as dest_hostname
by src dest parent_process_path parent_process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_integrity_level process_id transport
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: table
| table
parent_process_integrity_level parent_process_path parent_process_arguments parent_process_hash
process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_arguments process_hash process_id
additional_logged_in_users_list module_name_list module_hash_list
src dest_hostname dest dest_port transport firstTime lastTime
Stage 6: search
| `cisco_nvm___suspicious_network_connection_from_process_with_no_args_filter`
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
dest | in | "10.0.0.0/8", "100.64.0.0/10", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.175.48.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1" |
process_arguments | eq | "*" |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
dest | in |
|
process_name | in |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|