Detection rules › Splunk

Cisco NVM - Suspicious Network Connection From Process With No Args

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, dest, parent_process_integrity_level, parent_process_name, process_id, process_name, src, transport
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

This analytic detects system binaries that are commonly abused in process injection techniques but are observed without any command-line arguments. It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled. Binaries such as rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, dllhost.exe, svchost.exe, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution. When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate potential injection and communication with a command and control server.

Known false positives

  • Some system binaries may execute without arguments in rare legitimate scenarios (e.g., certain service launches), and initiate a network connection to microsoft servers for telemetry or update purposes. Apply additional filters as needed. However, binaries such as `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` running with no command-line context are highly suspicious and warrant investigation.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

name: Cisco NVM - Suspicious Network Connection From Process With No Args
id: 54fa06c5-96a2-4406-a4a7-44d93ddbd173
version: 6
creation_date: '2025-07-01'
modification_date: '2026-07-14'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    This analytic detects system binaries that are commonly abused in process injection techniques but are observed without any command-line arguments.
    It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
    to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
    Binaries such as `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `dllhost.exe`, `svchost.exe`, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution.
    When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate
    potential injection and communication with a command and control server.
data_source:
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |
    `cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`
    process_name IN (
      "backgroundtaskhost.exe", "svchost.exe", "dllhost.exe", "werfault.exe",
      "searchprotocolhost.exe", "wuauclt.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "rundll32.exe",
      "regasm.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "regsvcs.exe"
    )
    NOT process_arguments="*"
    NOT dest IN (
            "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
            "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
            "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
            "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
            "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1"
            )
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
            values(parent_process_arguments) as parent_process_arguments
            values(process_arguments) as process_arguments
            values(parent_process_hash) as parent_process_hash
            values(process_hash) as process_hash
            values(module_name_list) as module_name_list
            values(module_hash_list) as module_hash_list
            values(dest_port) as dest_port
            values(aliul) as additional_logged_in_users_list
            values(dest_hostname) as dest_hostname
            by src dest parent_process_path parent_process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_integrity_level process_id transport
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | table
      parent_process_integrity_level parent_process_path parent_process_arguments parent_process_hash
      process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_arguments process_hash process_id
      additional_logged_in_users_list module_name_list module_hash_list
      src dest_hostname dest dest_port transport firstTime lastTime
    | `cisco_nvm___suspicious_network_connection_from_process_with_no_args_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    This search requires Network Visibility Module logs, which includes the flow data sourcetype.
    This search uses an input macro named `cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`.
    We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
    (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Cisco Network Visibility Module logs.
    Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.
    The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
    The logs are to be ingested using the Splunk Add-on for Cisco Endpoint Security Analytics (CESA) (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4221).
known_false_positives: |
    Some system binaries may execute without arguments in rare legitimate scenarios (e.g., certain service launches), and initiate
    a network connection to microsoft servers for telemetry or update purposes. Apply additional filters as needed.
    However, binaries such as `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` running with no command-line context are highly suspicious and warrant investigation.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/process-injection/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: src
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: The $process_name$ was seen on host $src$ executing without any command-line arguments and initiating a network connection towards $dest$. This might indicate a potential communication with a C&C server.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1055
    - T1218
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`cisco_network_visibility_module_flowdata`
process_name IN (
  "backgroundtaskhost.exe", "svchost.exe", "dllhost.exe", "werfault.exe",
  "searchprotocolhost.exe", "wuauclt.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "rundll32.exe",
  "regasm.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "regsvcs.exe"
)
NOT process_arguments="*"
NOT dest IN (
        "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "100.64.0.0/10",
        "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32",
        "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
        "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "192.175.48.0/24",
        "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1"
        )

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        values(parent_process_arguments) as parent_process_arguments
        values(process_arguments) as process_arguments
        values(parent_process_hash) as parent_process_hash
        values(process_hash) as process_hash
        values(module_name_list) as module_name_list
        values(module_hash_list) as module_hash_list
        values(dest_port) as dest_port
        values(aliul) as additional_logged_in_users_list
        values(dest_hostname) as dest_hostname
        by src dest parent_process_path parent_process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_integrity_level process_id transport

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: table

| table
  parent_process_integrity_level parent_process_path parent_process_arguments parent_process_hash
  process_integrity_level process_path process_name process_arguments process_hash process_id
  additional_logged_in_users_list module_name_list module_hash_list
  src dest_hostname dest dest_port transport firstTime lastTime

Stage 6: search

| `cisco_nvm___suspicious_network_connection_from_process_with_no_args_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
destin"10.0.0.0/8", "100.64.0.0/10", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.175.48.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1"excludes:dest
process_argumentseq"*"excludes:process_arguments

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
process_namein
  • "backgroundtaskhost.exe"
  • "dllhost.exe"
  • "regasm.exe"
  • "regsvcs.exe"
  • "regsvr32.exe"
  • "rundll32.exe"
  • "searchprotocolhost.exe"
  • "spoolsv.exe"
  • "svchost.exe"
  • "werfault.exe"
  • "wuauclt.exe"
field:"process_name" kind:in
sourcetypein
  • "cisco:nvm:flowdata"
  • "cisco:nvm:flowdata:v2"
field:"sourcetype" kind:in