Detection rules › Splunk
Cisco SD-WAN - Low Frequency Rogue Peer
This analytic identifies low-frequency Cisco SD-WAN control peering activity from control-connection-state-change events where "new-state:up". It extracts "peer-type" and "peer-system-ip", groups events by these two fields, and counts how often each combination appears within the selected time window. Combinations whose count is less than or equal to the defined threshold (currently <=3 occurrences in the search window) are flagged as rare. Analysts should prioritize peer identities that are rarely observed in the environment, particularly those involving unexpected peer-type roles or unfamiliar peer-system-ip values. Rare control-plane peers may indicate misconfiguration, unauthorized SD-WAN components, infrastructure drift, or potentially malicious control-plane connection attempts. Findings might indicate the potential exploitation of CVE-2026-20127. Note that the threshold setting is set to "3", but its highly recommended that this should be adapted to the environment before deploying this search.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Rule body splunk
name: Cisco SD-WAN - Low Frequency Rogue Peer
id: 0fe052a5-07b8-48e7-9fc8-d6a3957eb914
version: 4
creation_date: '2026-03-03'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
This analytic identifies low-frequency Cisco SD-WAN control peering activity from control-connection-state-change events where "new-state:up".
It extracts "peer-type" and "peer-system-ip", groups events by these two fields, and counts how often each combination appears within the selected time window.
Combinations whose count is less than or equal to the defined threshold (currently <=3 occurrences in the search window) are flagged as rare.
Analysts should prioritize peer identities that are rarely observed in the environment, particularly those involving unexpected peer-type roles or unfamiliar peer-system-ip values.
Rare control-plane peers may indicate misconfiguration, unauthorized SD-WAN components, infrastructure drift, or potentially malicious control-plane connection attempts.
Findings might indicate the potential exploitation of CVE-2026-20127.
Note that the threshold setting is set to "3", but its highly recommended that this should be adapted to the environment before deploying this search.
data_source:
- Cisco SD-WAN NTCE 1000001
search: |
`cisco_sd_wan_syslog`
TERM("*control-connection-state-change*")
TERM("*new-state:up*")
TERM("*peer-system-ip:*")
TERM("*public-ip:*")
| rex field=_raw "^(?<event_timestamp>(?:[A-Z][a-z]{2}\s+\d{1,2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(?:\.\d{3})?|[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}T[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}(?:\.\d{1,6})?(?:Z|[+-][0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2})))\s*:?"
| rex field=_raw "^(?:[A-Z][a-z]{2}\s+\d{1,2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(?:\.\d{3})?\s*:?\s+)(?<prefix_host>[^\s:]+)\s+\S+(?:\[\d+\])?:\s+%"
| eval dest=coalesce(prefix_host, legacy_host, device_name, host)
| rex field=_raw "new-state:(?<new_state>\S+)"
| rex field=_raw "peer-type:(?<peer_type>\S+)"
| rex field=_raw "peer-system-ip:(?<peer_system_ip>\S+)"
| rex field=_raw "public-ip:(?<public_ip>\S+)"
| rex field=_raw "public-port:(?<public_port>\d+)"
| where isnotnull(peer_type) AND isnotnull(peer_system_ip)
| stats count
values(dest) as dest
values(public_ip) as public_ips
values(public_port) as public_ports
by peer_type peer_system_ip
| where count <= 3
| sort 0 count asc
| table dest peer_type peer_system_ip public_ips
public_ports count
| `cisco_sd_wan___low_frequency_rogue_peer_filter`
how_to_implement: |
This analytic requires Cisco SD-WAN/vSmart logs in Splunk and assumes control peering status
messages are searchable via the `cisco_sd_wan_syslog` macro. Update that macro with your environment-specific index and sourcetype settings.
Build a known-good baseline (lookup or macro conditions) for expected `peer-system-ip`, `public-ip`, and `peer-type` relationships, then tune the `cisco_sd_wan_rogue_peer_outlier_filter` macro to suppress approved peers and transport sources.
The threshold (`<=3`) is a starting point and should be adjusted for your environment size and log
volume.
Follow the documentation https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/sdwan/17-x/systems-interfaces/systems-interfaces-guide-17-x/system-logging.html#config-sys-logging to start ingesting these logs.
known_false_positives: |
New controller onboarding, topology expansion, controller failover, maintenance windows, and temporary transport.
Path changes can create rare peer/public-IP combinations.
Validate outliers against change records and known SD-WAN inventory before escalating.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/supplemental-direction-ed-26-03-hunt-and-hardening-guidance-cisco-sd-wan-systems
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-8616-sd-wan/
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/sdwan/configuration/Monitor-And-Maintain/monitor-maintain-book/m-alarms-events-logs.html
- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/sdwan/17-x/systems-interfaces/systems-interfaces-guide-17-x/system-logging.html#config-sys-logging
- https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/Cisco-Catalyst-SD-WAN-HardeningGuide
- https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: The SD-WAN device $dest$ established a rare control connection to peer-system-ip $peer_system_ip$ with peer-type $peer_type$ (observed $count$ times).
analytic_story:
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Analytics
asset_type: Network
cve:
- CVE-2026-20127
mitre_attack_id:
- T1190
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: network
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/cisco_sd_wan/vsyslog/vsyslog.log
source: /var/log/vsyslog
sourcetype: cisco:sdwan:syslog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`cisco_sd_wan_syslog`
TERM("*control-connection-state-change*")
TERM("*new-state:up*")
TERM("*peer-system-ip:*")
TERM("*public-ip:*")
Stage 2: rex
| rex field=_raw "^(?<event_timestamp>(?:[A-Z][a-z]{2}\s+\d{1,2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(?:\.\d{3})?|[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}T[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}(?:\.\d{1,6})?(?:Z|[+-][0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2})))\s*:?"
Stage 3: rex
| rex field=_raw "^(?:[A-Z][a-z]{2}\s+\d{1,2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(?:\.\d{3})?\s*:?\s+)(?<prefix_host>[^\s:]+)\s+\S+(?:\[\d+\])?:\s+%"
Stage 4: eval
| eval dest=coalesce(prefix_host, legacy_host, device_name, host)
Stage 5: rex
| rex field=_raw "new-state:(?<new_state>\S+)"
Stage 6: rex
| rex field=_raw "peer-type:(?<peer_type>\S+)"
Stage 7: rex
| rex field=_raw "peer-system-ip:(?<peer_system_ip>\S+)"
Stage 8: rex
| rex field=_raw "public-ip:(?<public_ip>\S+)"
Stage 9: rex
| rex field=_raw "public-port:(?<public_port>\d+)"
Stage 10: where
| where isnotnull(peer_type) AND isnotnull(peer_system_ip)
Stage 11: stats
| stats count
values(dest) as dest
values(public_ip) as public_ips
values(public_port) as public_ports
by peer_type peer_system_ip
Stage 12: where
| where count <= 3
Stage 13: sort
| sort 0 count asc
Stage 14: table
| table dest peer_type peer_system_ip public_ips
public_ports count
Stage 15: search
| `cisco_sd_wan___low_frequency_rogue_peer_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
count | le |
|
peer_system_ip | is_not_null | |
peer_type | is_not_null | |
sourcetype | eq |
|
Search terms
Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "*control-connection-state-change*" |
| 1 | "*new-state:up*" |
| 1 | "*peer-system-ip:*" |
| 1 | "*public-ip:*" |