Detection rules › Splunk

CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
dest, image_loaded, original_file_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, service_dll_signature_exists, service_dll_signature_verified, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of COM objects like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass User Account Control (UAC). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify the loading of specific DLLs (CMLUA.dll, CMSTPLUA.dll, CMLUAUTIL.dll) by processes not typically associated with these libraries. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to gain elevated privileges, a common tactic used by ransomware adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with administrative rights, leading to potential system compromise and further malicious activities.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 7: Image loaded

Rule body

name: CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass
id: f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-05-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of COM objects like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass User Account Control (UAC). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify the loading of specific DLLs (CMLUA.dll, CMSTPLUA.dll, CMLUAUTIL.dll) by processes not typically associated with these libraries. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to gain elevated privileges, a common tactic used by ransomware adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with administrative rights, leading to potential system compromise and further malicious activities.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 7
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7  ImageLoaded IN ("*\\CMLUA.dll", "*\\CMSTPLUA.dll", "*\\CMLUAUTIL.dll") NOT(process_name IN("CMSTP.exe", "CMMGR32.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003/
finding:
    title: The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - DarkSide Ransomware
    - Ransomware
    - LockBit Ransomware
    - ValleyRAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=7  ImageLoaded IN ("*\\CMLUA.dll", "*\\CMSTPLUA.dll", "*\\CMLUAUTIL.dll") NOT(process_name IN("CMSTP.exe", "CMMGR32.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*"))

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imagein"*\\program files*", "*\\windows\\*"excludes:Image
process_namein"CMMGR32.exe", "CMSTP.exe"excludes:process_name

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 7 corpus 41 (splunk 39, elastic 1, kusto 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7"
ImageLoadedin
  • "*\\CMLUA.dll"
  • "*\\CMLUAUTIL.dll"
  • "*\\CMSTPLUA.dll"
field:"ImageLoaded" kind:in