Common LSASS Memory Dump Behavior (Windows Event Log)

Group by: _time, host, process_name
Source: github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This use case looks for behaviors from common tools such as mimikatz, ATPminidump, Dumpert, and CreateMiniDump. -- Threat Actor association: Alloy Taurus/Gallium, APT29/Nobelium, BlackCat, Cadet Blizzard, Carbanak, FIN6, FIN7, FIN12, Flax Typhoon, Lancefly, MalKamak, Phosphorus/Magic Hound/APT35, TA505, TA551, Traveling Spider, UNC2628, Volt Typhoon, Wizard Spider -- Software association: Bazar, BianLian, Blackcat/ALPHV, Clop, Conti, IcedID, GhostShell, Hafnium, Hive, Nefilim, Play, Sodinokibi/REvil, Quantum, Trigona, Trickbot, XingLocker

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1003.001` OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

References

https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4656	A handle to an object was requested.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4703	A user right was adjusted.

Rule body yaml

id: '6001.6380'
title: Common LSASS Memory Dump Behavior
description: 'Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the
  process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). This use
  case looks for behaviors from common tools such as mimikatz, ATPminidump, Dumpert,
  and CreateMiniDump. -- Threat Actor association: Alloy Taurus/Gallium, APT29/Nobelium,
  BlackCat, Cadet Blizzard, Carbanak, FIN6, FIN7, FIN12, Flax Typhoon, Lancefly, MalKamak,
  Phosphorus/Magic Hound/APT35, TA505, TA551, Traveling Spider, UNC2628, Volt Typhoon,
  Wizard Spider -- Software association: Bazar, BianLian, Blackcat/ALPHV, Clop, Conti,
  IcedID, GhostShell, Hafnium, Hive, Nefilim, Play, Sodinokibi/REvil, Quantum, Trigona,
  Trickbot, XingLocker -- Atomics T1003.001 Test #4 Atomics T1003.001 Test #7 Atomics
  T1003.001 Test #8 Atomics T1003.001 Test #11 Atomics T1003.001 Test #12 Atomics
  T1003.004 Test #1'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` ((TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "exe") OR ((TERM(EventCode=4656) OR "<EventID>4656<")
  "lsass.exe") OR ((TERM(EventCode=4703) OR "<EventID>4703<") "exe") | regex user!="\$"|
  regex process_name!="(?i)(system32|syswow64)"| table _time, host, user parent_*,
  process, process_*, signature_id | bin span=5s | stats values(*) as * by _time,
  host, process_name | where event_count < 5 AND (match(signature_id, "4688") and
  match(signature_id, "4656")) OR (match(signature_id, "4688") and match(signature_id,
  "4703")) '
techniques:
- credential-access:os credential dumping:lsass memory
technique_id:
- T1003.001
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` ((TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "exe") OR ((TERM(EventCode=4656) OR "<EventID>4656<") "lsass.exe") OR ((TERM(EventCode=4703) OR "<EventID>4703<") "exe")

Stage 2: `regex`

| regex user!="\$"

Stage 3: `regex`

| regex process_name!="(?i)(system32|syswow64)"

Stage 4: `table`

| table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id

Stage 5: `bucket`

| bin span=5s

Stage 6: `stats`

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host, process_name

Stage 7: `where`

| where event_count < 5 AND (match(signature_id, "4688") and match(signature_id, "4656")) OR (match(signature_id, "4688") and match(signature_id, "4703"))

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`user`	regex_match	`"$"`
`process_name`	regex_match	`"(?i)(system32\|syswow64)"`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventCode`	eq	`4656` corpus 19 (splunk 15, kusto 4) `4688` corpus 313 (splunk 283, kusto 30) `4703` corpus 2 (splunk 2)
`event_count`	lt	`5` corpus 3 (splunk 3)
`signature_id`	match	`"4656"` corpus 3 (splunk 3) `"4688"` corpus 8 (splunk 8) `"4703"`

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

Stage	Term
1	`TERM`
1	`"<EventID>4688<"`
1	`"exe"`
1	`TERM`
1	`"<EventID>4656<"`
1	`"lsass.exe"`
1	`TERM`
1	`"<EventID>4703<"`
1	`"exe"`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Common LSASS Memory Dump Behavior (Windows Event Log)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `regex`

Stage 3: `regex`

Stage 4: `table`

Stage 5: `bucket`

Stage 6: `stats`

Stage 7: `where`

Exclusions

Indicators

Search terms

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Common LSASS Memory Dump Behavior (Windows Event Log)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

Stage 2: regex

Stage 3: regex

Stage 4: table

Stage 5: bucket

Stage 6: stats

Stage 7: where

Exclusions

Indicators

Search terms

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `regex`

Stage 3: `regex`

Stage 4: `table`

Stage 5: `bucket`

Stage 6: `stats`

Stage 7: `where`