Detection rules › Splunk
Consent.exe Suspicious Child Process (Sysmon)
Consent.exe is a process created by Microsoft Windows that is responsible for managing User Account Control (UAC) consent. This use case detects any suspicious child process of consent.exe in attempt to escalate privileges.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Privilege Escalation |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule body
id: '32338.57517'
title: Consent.exe Suspicious Child Process
description: Consent.exe is a process created by Microsoft Windows that is responsible
for managing User Account Control (UAC) consent. This use case detects any suspicious
child process of consent.exe in attempt to escalate privileges.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
"consent.exe" | regex parent_process_path="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconsent\.exe"
| regex process_path!="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cWerFault\.exe" | table _time,
host, user, process, process_*, parent_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by
_time, host '
techniques:
- execution:command and scripting interpreter
- privilege-escalation:exploitation for privilege escalation
technique_id:
- T1059
- T1068
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://blog.snapattack.com/hunting-cve-2024-30051-8de021f0cf77
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5tlqwWZdJA
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "consent.exe"
Stage 2: regex
| regex parent_process_path="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconsent\.exe"
Stage 3: regex
| regex process_path!="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cWerFault\.exe"
Stage 4: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_*
Stage 5: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 6: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process_path | regex_match | "(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cWerFault.exe" | excludes:process_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1" |
parent_process_path | regex_match |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>1<" |
| 1 | "consent.exe" |