Detection rules › Splunk

Consent.exe Suspicious Child Process (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Consent.exe is a process created by Microsoft Windows that is responsible for managing User Account Control (UAC) consent. This use case detects any suspicious child process of consent.exe in attempt to escalate privileges.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '32338.57517'
title: Consent.exe Suspicious Child Process
description: Consent.exe is a process created by Microsoft Windows that is responsible
  for managing User Account Control (UAC) consent. This use case detects any suspicious
  child process of consent.exe in attempt to escalate privileges.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  "consent.exe" | regex parent_process_path="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconsent\.exe"
  | regex process_path!="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cWerFault\.exe" | table _time,
  host, user, process, process_*, parent_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by
  _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:command and scripting interpreter
- privilege-escalation:exploitation for privilege escalation
technique_id: 
- T1059
- T1068
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://blog.snapattack.com/hunting-cve-2024-30051-8de021f0cf77
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5tlqwWZdJA
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "consent.exe"

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_path="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconsent\.exe"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process_path!="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cWerFault\.exe"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process_pathregex_match"(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cWerFault.exe"excludes:process_path

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
parent_process_pathregex_match
  • "(?i):\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconsent.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1"consent.exe"