Detection rules › Splunk

Create_Modify Schtasks (PowerShell)

Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Detects possible persistent backdoor access using schtasks -- Threat Group Association: Actinium/Gamaredon/Primitive Bear, Alloy Taurus/Gallium, APT29/Nobelium/Cozy Bear, APT31, APT33, APT34/OilRig, APT35/Phosphorus/Magic Hound, APT41, APT43, BlackByte, BlackCat, Blind Eagle/APT-C-36, Evilnum, FIN7, FIN12, Gamaredon Group/Shuckworm, GoldenJackal, Lazarus, Memento Team, MuddyWater, Redfly, TA428, Turla (akaSecret Blizzard, KRYPTON, and UAC-0003), Vice Society, WinterVivern/UAC-0114, WIRTE, Witchetty

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

id: '1071.1109'
title: Create_Modify Schtasks
description: 'Detects possible persistent backdoor access using schtasks -- Threat
  Group Association: Actinium/Gamaredon/Primitive Bear, Alloy Taurus/Gallium, APT29/Nobelium/Cozy
  Bear, APT31, APT33, APT34/OilRig, APT35/Phosphorus/Magic Hound, APT41, APT43, BlackByte,
  BlackCat, Blind Eagle/APT-C-36, Evilnum, FIN7, FIN12, Gamaredon Group/Shuckworm,
  GoldenJackal, Lazarus, Memento Team, MuddyWater, Redfly, TA428, Turla (akaSecret
  Blizzard, KRYPTON, and UAC-0003), Vice Society, WinterVivern/UAC-0114, WIRTE, Witchetty
  - Software Association: Blackbyte, Black Basta, BianLian, Cactus, Conti, GoMet,
  HermeticWiper/Trojan.Killdisk, Lockbit, Lorenz, LV, NanoCore, Play, Prestige, Prometheus/Spook,
  Rhysida, Trickbot, XingLocker - Atomics T1036.004 Test #1 Atomics T1053.005 Test#1
  Atomics T1053.005 Test#2 Atomics T1053.005 Test#3 Atomics T1053.005 Test#4 - #TrendingThreat
  #Russia #Ukraine'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4104) OR
  TERM(EventCode=4103)) AND (("schtasks" AND ("/create" OR "/change")) OR (TERM(Schedule.Service)
  "GetFolder") OR "New-ScheduledTask")| rex field=process mode=sed max_match=0 "s/(?mi)^(Path.+)|^(ScriptBlock
  ID.+)|^(Creating Scriptblock.+)//g"| rex field=process mode=sed "s/([\n\r]+)|(\s\s+)//g"|
  rex field=process max_match=0 (?<schtask>"(?i)(schtasks\s+\/(create|change)|Schedule.Service.{1,20})")|
  rex field=process max_match=0 (?<user>"(?i)/ru.+")| rex field=user mode=sed max_match=0
  "s/(?i)^(\/ru )//g"| table _time, host, user _time, host, process, user, signature_id,
  schtask| bin span=300s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host `hec_collect`'
techniques:
- execution:scheduled task/job:scheduled task
- persistence:scheduled task/job:scheduled task
technique_id:
- T1053.005
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
- Process command-line parameters
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

search EventCode=4103 EventCode=4104 source="*" source IN ("WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", "WinEventLog:Windows", "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational")

Stage 2: eval

eval _rex_sed_skipped = (...)

Stage 3: eval

eval _rex_sed_skipped = (...)

Stage 4: rex

rex field=process ... -> schtask

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4103 corpus 105 (splunk 105)
  • 4104 corpus 268 (splunk 268)

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

StageTerm
1TERM
1TERM
1"schtasks"
1"/create"
1"/change"
1TERM
1Schedule.Service
1"GetFolder"
1"New-ScheduledTask"