Detection rules › Splunk

Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Steven Dick
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific command patterns associated with Certify's enumeration and exploitation functions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized certificate issuance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information by abusing AD CS.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging
id: f533ca6c-9440-4686-80cb-7f294c07812a
version: 14
creation_date: '2023-07-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of the Certify tool via an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify specific command patterns associated with Certify's enumeration and exploitation functions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance or exploitation attempts against AD CS, which could lead to unauthorized certificate issuance. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information by abusing AD CS.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText IN ("*find *") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* /vulnerable*","* -vulnerable*","* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *","* /json /outfile*")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (,"*auth *","*req *",) AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* -ca *","* -username *","* -u *")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN ("*request *","*download *") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* /ca:*"))
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | eval file_name = case(isnotnull(file_name),file_name,true(),"unknown")
      | eval signature = substr(command,0,256)
      | `detect_certify_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba..
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify
    - https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
finding:
    title: Certify arguments through PowerShell detected on $dest$.
    entity:
        field: user_id
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: Certify arguments through PowerShell detected on $dest$.
analytic_story:
    - Windows Certificate Services
    - Malicious PowerShell
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
    - T1649
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText IN ("*find *") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* /vulnerable*","* -vulnerable*","* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *","* /json /outfile*")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (,"*auth *","*req *",) AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* -ca *","* -username *","* -u *")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN ("*request *","*download *") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* /ca:*"))

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest signature signature_id
       user_id vendor_product EventID
       Guid Opcode Name
       Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
       ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: eval

| eval file_name = case(isnotnull(file_name),file_name,true(),"unknown")
file_name =
ifisnotnull(file_name)file_name
else"unknown"

Stage 7: eval

| eval signature = substr(command,0,256)

Stage 8: search

| `detect_certify_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104"
ScriptBlockTextin
  • "* -ca *"
  • "* -u *"
  • "* -username *"
  • "* -vulnerable*"
  • "* /ca:*"
  • "* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *"
  • "* /json /outfile*"
  • "* /vulnerable*"
  • "*auth *"
  • "*download *"
  • "*find *"
  • "*req *"
  • "*request *"
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:in