Detection rules › Splunk

Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) loading a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote URL. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to run scripts using engines like JScript or VBScript, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.

Known false positives

  • Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line
id: 8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e
version: 17
creation_date: '2021-02-11'
modification_date: '2026-07-14'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) loading a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote URL. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to run scripts using engines like JScript or VBScript, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Flow Data
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE `process_hh` Processes.process=*http*
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Hh/
    - https://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files
    - https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/cce31c8602a144d8f2172a73d510e0e7
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220119133748/https://cyberforensicator.com/2019/01/20/silence-dissecting-malicious-chm-files-and-performing-forensic-analysis/
finding:
    title: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ contacting a remote destination to potentally download a malicious payload.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity
    - Living Off The Land
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Cisco Network Visibility Module Analytics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE `process_hh` Processes.process=*http*
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "HH.EXE" corpus 11 (sigma 5, splunk 4, elastic 2)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processeq
  • "*http*" corpus 52 (sigma 34, elastic 15, chronicle 2, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "hh.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 5, splunk 3)
field:"process_name" kind:eq