Detection rules › Splunk

Detect Rare Executables

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
process_name
Author
Bhavin Patel, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of rare processes that appear only once across the network within a specified timeframe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant for a SOC as it helps identify potentially malicious activities or unauthorized software, which could indicate a security breach or ongoing attack. If confirmed malicious, such rare processes could lead to data theft, privilege escalation, or complete system compromise, making early detection crucial for minimizing impact. The search currently identifies processes executed on fewer than 10 hosts, but this threshold can be adjusted based on the organization's environment and risk tolerance. The search groups results by process name which can lead to blind spots if a malicious process uses a common name. To mitigate this, consider enhancing the detection logic to group by additional attributes such as process hash.

Known false positives

  • Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. Apply additional filters as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Execution

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Detect Rare Executables
id: 44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac
version: 14
creation_date: '2020-04-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects the execution of rare processes that appear only once across the network within a specified timeframe.
    It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs.
    This activity is significant for a SOC as it helps identify potentially malicious activities or unauthorized software, which could indicate a security breach or ongoing attack.
    If confirmed malicious, such rare processes could lead to data theft, privilege escalation, or complete system compromise, making early detection crucial for minimizing impact.
    The search currently identifies processes executed on fewer than 10 hosts, but this threshold can be adjusted based on the organization's environment and risk tolerance.
    The search groups results by process name which can lead to blind spots if a malicious process uses a common name. To mitigate this, consider enhancing the detection logic to group by additional attributes such as process hash.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      dc(Processes.dest) as dc_dest
      values(Processes.dest) as dest
      values(Processes.user) as user
      min(_time) as firstTime
      max(_time) as lastTime
      latest(Processes.action) as action
      values(Processes.original_file_name) as original_file_name
      values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process
      values(Processes.parent_process_exec) as parent_process_exec
      latest(Processes.parent_process_guid) as parent_process_guid
      latest(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id
      values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name
      values(Processes.parent_process_path) as parent_process_path
      values(Processes.process) as process
      values(Processes.process_exec) as process_exec
      latest(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid
      values(Processes.process_hash) as process_hash
      values(Processes.process_path) as process_path
      latest(Processes.process_id) as process_id
      latest(Processes.process_integrity_level) as process_integrity_level
      latest(Processes.user_id) as user_id
      latest(Processes.vendor_product) as vendor_product
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    by Processes.process_name
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | search dc_dest < 10
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `detect_rare_executables_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment.
    Apply additional filters as needed.
references: []
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A rare process - [$process_name$] has been detected on less than 10 hosts on $dest$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - China-Nexus Threat Activity
    - Unusual Processes
    - SnappyBee
    - Salt Typhoon
    - Rhysida Ransomware
    - Crypto Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1204
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  dc(Processes.dest) as dc_dest
  values(Processes.dest) as dest
  values(Processes.user) as user
  min(_time) as firstTime
  max(_time) as lastTime
  latest(Processes.action) as action
  values(Processes.original_file_name) as original_file_name
  values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process
  values(Processes.parent_process_exec) as parent_process_exec
  latest(Processes.parent_process_guid) as parent_process_guid
  latest(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id
  values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name
  values(Processes.parent_process_path) as parent_process_path
  values(Processes.process) as process
  values(Processes.process_exec) as process_exec
  latest(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid
  values(Processes.process_hash) as process_hash
  values(Processes.process_path) as process_path
  latest(Processes.process_id) as process_id
  latest(Processes.process_integrity_level) as process_integrity_level
  latest(Processes.user_id) as user_id
  latest(Processes.vendor_product) as vendor_product
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by Processes.process_name

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| search dc_dest < 10

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `detect_rare_executables_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.