Detection rules › Splunk
Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry
The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling security audit logs by adding a specific registry entry. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "Control\MiniNt" registry path. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows from logging any events to the Security Log, effectively blinding security monitoring efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their actions and compromising the integrity of security audits.
Known false positives
- No false positives have been identified at this time.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule body
name: Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry
id: 39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122
version: 16
creation_date: '2021-10-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling security audit logs by adding a specific registry entry. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "Control\\MiniNt" registry path. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows from logging any events to the Security Log, effectively blinding security monitoring efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their actions and compromising the integrity of security audits.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control\\MiniNt\\*") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112
finding:
title: Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ on $dest$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- CISA AA23-347A
- Windows Registry Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1112
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control\\MiniNt\\*") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
Stage 3: where
| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Registry.registry_path | eq |
| field:"registry_path" kind:eq |
registry_value_data | is_not_null | field:"Details" kind:is_not_null |