Detection rules › Splunk

Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
TargetObject, computer_name, details, event_type, process_guid, process_id, registry_hive, registry_path, registry_status, registry_value_name, registry_value_type, user, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable SmartScreen protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with SmartScreen settings. This activity is significant because SmartScreen provides an early warning system against phishing and malware. Disabling it can indicate malicious intent, often seen in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to evade detection while downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, increasing the risk of successful phishing attacks and malware infections.

Known false positives

  • admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Defense Impairment

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection
id: 664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122
version: 17
creation_date: '2021-03-31'
modification_date: '2026-06-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry that disable SmartScreen protection. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with SmartScreen settings. This activity is significant because SmartScreen provides an early warning system against phishing and malware. Disabling it can indicate malicious intent, often seen in Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to evade detection while downloading additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to bypass security measures, increasing the risk of successful phishing attacks and malware infections.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
       WHERE (
              Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\SmartScreenEnabled", "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\EnableSmartScreen")
              Registry.registry_value_data  IN ("Off", "0", 0x00000000))
              by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
         | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
         | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
         | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
         | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
references:
    - https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/01/remcos-rat-evading-windows-defender-av.html
finding:
    title: The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: The Windows Smartscreen was disabled on $dest$ by $user$.
analytic_story:
    - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Windows Registry Abuse
    - Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1685
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
   WHERE (
          Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\SmartScreenEnabled", "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\EnableSmartScreen")
          Registry.registry_value_data  IN ("Off", "0", 0x00000000))
          by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Registry.registry_pathin
  • "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\EnableSmartScreen"
  • "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\SmartScreenEnabled"
field:"registry_path" kind:in
Registry.registry_value_datain
  • "0" corpus 18 (elastic 15, sigma 3)
  • "0x00000000" corpus 41 (splunk 33, elastic 8)
  • "Off"
field:"Details" kind:in