Detection rules › Splunk

DLL Execution from Uncommon Process (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

During an attack using Ursnif malware, threat actors were observed executing DLLs with a renamed rundll32 binary. This use case detects execution of the DLL functions DllRegisterServer, DllMain, DllUnregisterServer, DllInstall, or DllCanUnloadNow from processes other than rundll32.exe

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '27341.49802'
title: DLL Execution from Uncommon Process
description: During an attack using Ursnif malware, threat actors were observed executing
  DLLs with a renamed rundll32 binary. This use case detects execution of the DLL
  functions DllRegisterServer, DllMain, DllUnregisterServer, DllInstall, or DllCanUnloadNow
  from processes other than rundll32.exe. Living Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS)
  (LOLBIN)
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ",DllRegisterServer" OR ",DllMain" OR ",DllUnregisterServer"
  OR ",DllInstall" OR ",DllCanUnloadNow" | rex field=process ",(?<dll_function>\S+)"|
  where not match(process_name, "(?i)rundll32\.exe") | table _time, host, user, process,
  process_*, parent_process*, dll_function | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by
  _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:rundll32
technique_id:
- T1218.011
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ",DllRegisterServer" OR ",DllMain" OR ",DllUnregisterServer" OR ",DllInstall" OR ",DllCanUnloadNow"

Stage 2: rex

| rex field=process ",(?<dll_function>\S+)"

Stage 3: where

| where not match(process_name, "(?i)rundll32\.exe")

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process*, dll_function

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process_nameregex_match"(?i)rundll32.exe"excludes:process_name

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4688 corpus 317 (splunk 283, kusto 33, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688"

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4688<"
1",DllRegisterServer"
1",DllMain"
1",DllUnregisterServer"
1",DllInstall"
1",DllCanUnloadNow"