DSQuery Domain Discovery

name: DSQuery Domain Discovery
id: cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-03-31'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of "dsquery.exe" with arguments targeting `TrustedDomain` queries directly from the command line. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it often indicates domain trust discovery, a common step in lateral movement or privilege escalation by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to map domain trusts, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized access to trusted domains.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain*
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)
finding:
    title: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Discovery
    - Domain Trust Discovery
    - Compromised Windows Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1482
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint