Dump File Identified (Windows Event Log)

Group by: _time, host
Source: github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. This use case looks command line arguments that include a ".dmp" file, which may indicate a dump has teken place or that a dmp file is being analyzed locally

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1003` OS Credential Dumping

References

https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass

Telemetry coverage

Provider	Record / event type
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688: A new process has been created.

Rule body

id: '6003.6382'
title: Dump File Identified
description: 'Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login
  and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password,
  from the operating system and software. This use case looks command line arguments
  that include a ".dmp" file, which may indicate a dump has teken place or that a
  dmp file is being analyzed locally. -- Threat Actor Association: Cadet Blizzard,
  Redfly - Software Association: Akira, Black Basta, LockBit, Quantum, Rhysida, Vice
  Society'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<") TERM(dmp)| regex Process_Command_Line="(?i)\.dmp" | table _time,
  host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id | bin span=1s | stats values(*)
  as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- credential-access:os credential dumping
technique_id: 
- T1003
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<") TERM(dmp)

Stage 2: `regex`

| regex Process_Command_Line="(?i)\.dmp"

Stage 3: `table`

| table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id

Stage 4: `bucket`

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: `stats`

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Field	Kind	Values	Search
`EventCode`	eq	`4688` corpus 317 (splunk 283, kusto 33, elastic 1)	`field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688"`
`Process_Command_Line`	regex_match	`"(?i).dmp"`	`field:"Process_Command_Line" kind:regex_match`

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

Stage	Term
1	`"<EventID>4688<"`
1	`dmp`