Detection rules › Splunk

ESXi System Information Discovery

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
command, dest, user
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

This detection identifies the use of ESXCLI system-level commands that retrieve configuration details. While used for legitimate administration, this behavior may also indicate adversary reconnaissance aimed at profiling the ESXi host's capabilities, build information, or system role in preparation for further compromise.

Known false positives

  • Administrators may use this command when troubleshooting. Tune as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Discovery

Rule body

name: ESXi System Information Discovery
id: b4d4217a-6673-4fb6-837d-07a522bdf9f7
version: 4
creation_date: '2025-07-11'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: This detection identifies the use of ESXCLI system-level commands that retrieve configuration details. While used for legitimate administration, this behavior may also indicate adversary reconnaissance aimed at profiling the ESXi host's capabilities, build information, or system role in preparation for further compromise.
data_source:
    - VMWare ESXi Syslog
search: '`esxi_syslog` Message="*system*" AND Message="*esxcli*" AND Message IN ("*get*","*list*") AND Message="*user=*" NOT Message="*filesystem*" | rex field=_raw "user=(?<user>\w+)\]\s+Dispatch\s+(?<command>[^\s]+)" | rex field=_raw "Z (?<dest>[\w\.]+)\s" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest user command | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esxi_system_information_discovery_filter`'
how_to_implement: This is based on syslog data generated by VMware ESXi hosts. To implement this search, you must configure your ESXi systems to forward syslog output to your Splunk deployment. These logs must be ingested with the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-on for VMware ESXi Logs, which provides field extractions and CIM compatibility.
known_false_positives: Administrators may use this command when troubleshooting. Tune as needed.
finding:
    title: System information discovery commands executed on ESXi host $dest$ by $user$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: System information discovery commands executed on ESXi host $dest$ by $user$.
analytic_story:
    - ESXi Post Compromise
    - Black Basta Ransomware
asset_type: Infrastructure
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1082
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: application
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`esxi_syslog` Message="*system*" AND Message="*esxcli*" AND Message IN ("*get*","*list*") AND Message="*user=*" NOT Message="*filesystem*"

Stage 2: rex

| rex field=_raw "user=(?<user>\w+)\]\s+Dispatch\s+(?<command>[^\s]+)"

Stage 3: rex

| rex field=_raw "Z (?<dest>[\w\.]+)\s"

Stage 4: stats

| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest user command

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `esxi_system_information_discovery_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Messageeq"*filesystem*"excludes:Message

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Messageeq
  • "*esxcli*"
  • "*system*"
  • "*user=*"
field:"Message" kind:eq
Messagein
  • "*get*"
  • "*list*"
field:"Message" kind:in
sourcetypein
  • vmw-syslog
  • vmware:esxlog*
field:"sourcetype" kind:in