Detection rules › Splunk

Excessive DRSGetNCChanges Requests (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, user
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. During a FIN8 attack, a desktop device performed more than 100 DRSGetNCChanges requests to a domain controller. Such activity, when not performed by new domain controllers to sync Active Directory contents, can indicate malicious domain or user enumeration, credential compromise or Active Directory enumeration. This use case detects excessive DRSGetNChanges requests (represented by GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2). Note: Windows Event ID 4662 must be logged and configured correctly for detection. Blocklisting event 4662 event collection and forwarding from expected hosts (likely other Domain Controllers) is recommended for best performance, as activity from DCs is expected behavior. See references for details

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '29487.53152'
title: Excessive DRSGetNCChanges Requests
description: 'Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information
  by abusing a Windows Domain Controller''s application programming interface (API)
  to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique
  called DCSync. During a FIN8 attack, a desktop device performed more than 100 DRSGetNCChanges
  requests to a domain controller. Such activity, when not performed by new domain
  controllers to sync Active Directory contents, can indicate malicious domain or
  user enumeration, credential compromise or Active Directory enumeration. This use
  case detects excessive DRSGetNChanges requests (represented by GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2).
  Note: Windows Event ID 4662 must be logged and configured correctly for detection.
  Blocklisting event 4662 event collection and forwarding from expected hosts (likely
  other Domain Controllers) is recommended for best performance, as activity from
  DCs is expected behavior. See references for details. -- Threat Actor Association:
  FIN8 (Syssphinx), Muddled Libra, Scattered Spider'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4662) OR
  "<EventID>4662<") "0x100" "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2" | table _time,
  host, user process, process_*, signature_id, parent_*, parameters | bin span=600s
  | stats values(*) as * by _time, user | where event_count > 5 '
techniques:
- credential-access:os credential dumping:dcsync
technique_id:
- T1003.006
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://blog.blacklanternsecurity.com/p/detecting-dcsync
- https://darktrace.com/blog/shining-a-light-on-syssphinx-darktraces-detection-of-a-novel-ransomware-attack
- https://community.netwitness.com/t5/netwitness-community-blog/dcsync-detection-with-netwitness/ba-p/695474
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/f977faaa-673e-4f66-b9bf-48c640241d47
- https://www.extrahop.com/company/blog/2021/dcsync-definition-and-protection/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4662) OR "<EventID>4662<") "0x100" "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"

Stage 2: table

| table _time, host, user process, process_*, signature_id, parent_*, parameters

Stage 3: bucket

| bin span=600s

Stage 4: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, user

Stage 5: where

| where event_count > 5

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4662 corpus 15 (splunk 7, kusto 4, elastic 3, chronicle 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4662"
event_countgt
  • 5
field:"event_count" kind:gt value:"5"

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4662<"
1"0x100"
1"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"