Executable File Written to Disk (Sysmon)

Group by: _time, file_name, host, target_filename
Source: github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Detects when a potentially malicious file is written to the disk

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Command & Control	`T1105` Ingress Tool Transfer

References

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4656

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 11	FileCreate

Rule body yaml

id: '1040.1060'
title: Executable File Written to Disk
description: 'Detects when a potentially malicious file is written to the disk. -
  Threat Actor Association: Alloy Taurus/Gallium, Andariel, APT28 (aka.Fancy Bear,
  Fighting Ursa, Forest Blizzard, Pawn Storm, TA422, STRONTIUM), APT29/Nobelium/Cozy
  Bear, APT34/OilRig, APT37, APT41, Arid Viper/APT C-23, Babuk, Carbanak, Evilnum,
  FIN6, FIN7, FIN8, Gamaredon (aka. Armageddon, UAC-0010), Kimsuky, Lazarus, MalKamak,
  Memento Team, Mustang Panda, Night Spider, TA2541, TA,505, TA551, Prophet Spider,
  Phosphorus/Magic Hound/APT35, SaintBear (aka UAC-0056, UNC2589, TA471), Scatter
  Swine, TA576, Wizard Spider -- Software Association: BadHatch, Bazar, Black Basta,
  BlackByte, Clop, Conti, Cring, Emotet, GhostShell, Hancitor, Harvester, IcedID,
  Lapsus$, MirrorBlast, PYSA/Mespinoza, QakBot, Ransom Cartel, Remcos, Ryuk, SquirrelWaffle,
  TargetCompany, Trickbot, Vidar Stealer, WhisperGate, XingLocker, Yanluowang, Zloader'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: ' `get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` EventCode=11 (TERM("bat")
  OR TERM("bin") OR TERM("cmd") OR TERM("com") OR TERM("e_e") OR TERM("ex_") OR TERM("exe")
  OR TERM("hta") OR TERM("jar") OR TERM("js") OR TERM("out") OR TERM("plx") OR TERM("ps1")
  OR TERM("py") OR TERM("pyc") OR TERM("rgs") OR TERM("script") OR TERM("sct") OR
  TERM("server") OR TERM("vb") OR TERM("ws") OR TERM("docm") OR TERM("dotm") OR TERM("xlm")
  OR TERM("xlsm") OR TERM("xltm") OR TERM("xla") OR TERM("xlam") OR TERM("xll") OR
  TERM("otm") OR TERM("pptm") OR TERM("potm") OR TERM("ppsm") OR TERM("sldm")) | regex
  file_name="\.(bat|bin|cmd|com|e_e|ex_|exe|hta|jar|js|out|plx|ps1|py|pyc|rgs|script|sct|server|vb|ws|docm|dotm|xlm|xlsm|xltm|xla|xlam|xll|otm|pptm|potm|ppsm|sldm)$"
  | regex file_path!="C:\x5cWindows\x5cTemp\x5c__PSScriptPolicyTest_\S+ps1" | eventstats
  c(file_path) as c_file_path by file_path| eventstats c(file_name) as c_file_name
  by file_name|where c_file_path < 10 AND c_file_name < 10 | table _time, host, user
  dest, direction, dvc, dvc_nt_host, event_id, eventtype, file_name, file_path, parent_process_id,
  process_id, process_name, process_path, signature_id, tag, user_id | bin span=1s
  | stats values(*) as * by _time, host, file_path '
techniques:
- command-and-control:ingress tool transfer
technique_id: 
- T1105
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4656

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` EventCode=11 (TERM("bat") OR TERM("bin") OR TERM("cmd") OR TERM("com") OR TERM("e_e") OR TERM("ex_") OR TERM("exe") OR TERM("hta") OR TERM("jar") OR TERM("js") OR TERM("out") OR TERM("plx") OR TERM("ps1") OR TERM("py") OR TERM("pyc") OR TERM("rgs") OR TERM("script") OR TERM("sct") OR TERM("server") OR TERM("vb") OR TERM("ws") OR TERM("docm") OR TERM("dotm") OR TERM("xlm") OR TERM("xlsm") OR TERM("xltm") OR TERM("xla") OR TERM("xlam") OR TERM("xll") OR TERM("otm") OR TERM("pptm") OR TERM("potm") OR TERM("ppsm") OR TERM("sldm"))

Stage 2: `regex`

| regex file_name="\.(bat|bin|cmd|com|e_e|ex_|exe|hta|jar|js|out|plx|ps1|py|pyc|rgs|script|sct|server|vb|ws|docm|dotm|xlm|xlsm|xltm|xla|xlam|xll|otm|pptm|potm|ppsm|sldm)$"

Stage 3: `regex`

| regex file_path!="C:\x5cWindows\x5cTemp\x5c__PSScriptPolicyTest_\S+ps1"

Stage 4: `eventstats`

| eventstats c(file_path) as c_file_path by file_path

Stage 5: `eventstats`

| eventstats c(file_name) as c_file_name by file_name

Stage 6: `where`

| where c_file_path < 10 AND c_file_name < 10

Stage 7: `table`

| table _time, host, user dest, direction, dvc, dvc_nt_host, event_id, eventtype, file_name, file_path, parent_process_id, process_id, process_name, process_path, signature_id, tag, user_id

Stage 8: `bucket`

| bin span=1s

Stage 9: `stats`

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host, file_path

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`file_path`	regex_match	`"C:\x5cWindows\x5cTemp\x5c__PSScriptPolicyTest_\S+ps1"`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventCode`	eq	`11` corpus 23 (splunk 21, kusto 2)
`c_file_name`	lt	`10`
`c_file_path`	lt	`10`
`file_name`	regex_match	`".(bat\|bin\|cmd\|com\|e_e\|ex_\|exe\|hta\|jar\|js\|out\|plx\|ps1\|py\|pyc\|rgs\|script\|sct\|server\|vb\|ws\|docm\|dotm\|xlm\|xlsm\|xltm\|xla\|xlam\|xll\|otm\|pptm\|potm\|ppsm\|sldm)$"`

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

Stage	Term
1	`"bat"`
1	`"bin"`
1	`"cmd"`
1	`"com"`
1	`"e_e"`
1	`"ex_"`
1	`"exe"`
1	`"hta"`
1	`"jar"`
1	`"js"`
1	`"out"`
1	`"plx"`
1	`"ps1"`
1	`"py"`
1	`"pyc"`
1	`"rgs"`
1	`"script"`
1	`"sct"`
1	`"server"`
1	`"vb"`
1	`"ws"`
1	`"docm"`
1	`"dotm"`
1	`"xlm"`
1	`"xlsm"`
1	`"xltm"`
1	`"xla"`
1	`"xlam"`
1	`"xll"`
1	`"otm"`
1	`"pptm"`
1	`"potm"`
1	`"ppsm"`
1	`"sldm"`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Executable File Written to Disk (Sysmon)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `regex`

Stage 3: `regex`

Stage 4: `eventstats`

Stage 5: `eventstats`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `table`

Stage 8: `bucket`

Stage 9: `stats`

Exclusions

Indicators

Search terms

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Executable File Written to Disk (Sysmon)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

Stage 2: regex

Stage 3: regex

Stage 4: eventstats

Stage 5: eventstats

Stage 6: where

Stage 7: table

Stage 8: bucket

Stage 9: stats

Exclusions

Indicators

Search terms

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `regex`

Stage 3: `regex`

Stage 4: `eventstats`

Stage 5: `eventstats`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `table`

Stage 8: `bucket`

Stage 9: `stats`