Executable Process from Suspicious Folder (PowerShell)

id: '5746.6449'
title: Executable Process from Suspicious Folder
description: 'Detects the execution of executable process spawned by powershell or
  similar processes from suspicious file locations like temp, appdata, and downloads.
  - Threat Actor Association: Andariel, APT10/menuPass, APT28 (aka.Fancy Bear, Fighting
  Ursa, Forest Blizzard, Pawn Storm, TA422, STRONTIUM), APT34/OilRig, Blind Eagle/APT-C-36,
  Carbanak, Evilnum, FIN7, FIN8, GoldenJackal, Gorgon Group, Kimsuky, Lazarus, Magic
  Hound (aka APT35, Charming Kitten, Phosphorus, and Mint Sandstorm), Mustang Panda
  (aka. Stately Taurus//Earth Preta/BRONZE PRESIDENT/TA416/RedDelta), Redfly, TA505,
  TA551, UNC2465, Volt Typhoon, WinterVivern/UAC-0114 -- Software Association: Babuk,
  BadHatch, Bazar, Blackbyte, Clop, IcedID, Lockbit, MagicRAT, PowerShortShell, PYSA/Mespinoza,
  SmokedHAM, SolidBit, RATDispenser, Remcos, TA413, TargetCompany, Trickbot, Trigona,
  Yellow Cockatoo/Jupiter Infostealer, Vidar Stealer, WhisperGate - #TrendingThreat
  #Russia #Ukraine - Atomics T1574.001 Test#1'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` TERM(EventCode=4104) ("Temporary
  Internet Files" OR TERM("TEMP") OR TERM("Downloads") OR TERM("Appdata"))| regex
  Path="(?i)Temp|Downloads|Appdata" | eval process_path=Path | table _time, host,
  user process, process_*, signature_id, user | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as *
  by _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:command and scripting interpreter
- execution:user execution
- execution:command and scripting interpreter:visual basic
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:rundll32
- execution:command and scripting interpreter:javascript
technique_id:
- T1059
- T1204
- T1059.007
- T1218.011
- T1059.005
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- PowerShell logs
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/