Detection rules › Splunk

Exfiltration via curl.exe - Windows (PowerShell)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Threat actors may abuse curl.exe on Windows systems to exfiltrate data or upload files to remote servers using command-line options like -d, -T, --form, or --upload-file. These flags are commonly used for HTTP POST requests, enabling attackers to transmit files or sensitive information during post-compromise activity. This use case detects process creation events where curl.exe is used with data or file upload arguments, potentially indicating data exfiltration, C2 communication, or malicious use of legitimate tools.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '45179.90471'
title: Exfiltration via curl.exe - Windows
description: Threat actors may abuse curl.exe on Windows systems to exfiltrate data
  or upload files to remote servers using command-line options like -d, -T, --form,
  or --upload-file. These flags are commonly used for HTTP POST requests, enabling
  attackers to transmit files or sensitive information during post-compromise activity.
  This use case detects process creation events where curl.exe is used with data or
  file upload arguments, potentially indicating data exfiltration, C2 communication,
  or malicious use of legitimate tools.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR
  "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") TERM(curl) ("-d" OR
  "-T" OR "-F" OR " --form" OR "--upload-file " OR "--data " OR "--data-") | where
  match(process, "(?i)curl") and (match(process, "\s-[dTF]\s") or match(process, "(?i)\s--(form|upload-file|data)\s|\s--data-"))
  | table _time, host, user, process, process_path, process_name, parent_process_name,
  user | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- exfiltration:exfiltration over alternative protocol
technique_id: 
- T1048
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_fileupload.yml
- https://x.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664
- https://medium.com/@petehouston/upload-files-with-curl-93064dcccc76
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") TERM(curl) ("-d" OR "-T" OR "-F" OR " --form" OR "--upload-file " OR "--data " OR "--data-")

Stage 2: where

| where match(process, "(?i)curl") and (match(process, "\s-[dTF]\s") or match(process, "(?i)\s--(form|upload-file|data)\s|\s--data-"))

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_path, process_name, parent_process_name, user

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4103 corpus 105 (splunk 105)
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq
processregex_match
    • "(?i)\s--(form|upload-file|data)\s
    • \s--data-"
    corpus 3 (splunk 3)
  • "(?i)curl"
  • "\s-[dTF]\s" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4103<"
1"<EventID>4104<"
1curl
1"-d"
1"-T"
1"-F"
1" --form"
1"--upload-file "
1"--data "
1"--data-"