Detection rules › Splunk

File Written to Startup Folder - Windows (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder. Adding an entry to the startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. This use case detects file writes to \Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 11: FileCreate

Rule body

id: '29486.53149'
title: File Written to Startup Folder - Windows
description: Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup
  folder. Adding an entry to the startup folder will cause the program referenced
  to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context
  of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. This use case
  detects file writes to \Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=11) OR "<EventID>11<")
  "Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup" | where !match(process_name,
  "(?i)wuauclt\.exe") and !match(TargetFile, "(?i)C:\x5c\$Windows\.~BT\x5cNewOS\x5c")
  | table _time, host, user, process, parent_process_name, process_exec | bin span=1s
  | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- persistence:boot or logon autostart execution:registry run keys / startup folder
technique_id:
- T1547.001
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://www.uptycs.com/blog/cryptocurrency-entities-at-risk-threat-actor-uses-parallax-rat-for-infiltration
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/62d4fd26b05f4d81973e7c8e80d7c1a0c6a29d0e/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_startup_folder_file_write.yml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=11) OR "<EventID>11<") "Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup"

Stage 2: where

| where !match(process_name, "(?i)wuauclt\.exe") and !match(TargetFile, "(?i)C:\x5c\$Windows\.~BT\x5cNewOS\x5c")

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user, process, parent_process_name, process_exec

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
TargetFileregex_match"(?i)C:\x5c$Windows.~BT\x5cNewOS\x5c"excludes:TargetFile
process_nameregex_match"(?i)wuauclt.exe"excludes:process_name

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 11 corpus 26 (splunk 24, kusto 2)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"11"

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>11<"
1"Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup"