Detection rules › Splunk

Full Control Permissions Granted to Everyone - Windows (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists and access protected files. Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs). Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. This use case detects commands assigning full control to Everyone which has been observed with Ryuk ransomware

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '17741.29689'
title: Full Control Permissions Granted to Everyone - Windows
description: 'Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade
  access control lists and access protected files. Windows implements file and directory
  ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs). Adversaries can interact with
  the DACLs using built-in Windows commands which can grant adversaries higher permissions
  on specific files and folders. This use case detects commands assigning full control
  to Everyone which has been observed with Ryuk ransomware. -- Threat Actor Association:
  UNC5812 -- Atomics T1222.001 Test #2 Atomics T1222.001 Test #5'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TERM(icacls) OR ("/grant" "Everyone:F") | regex
  process="(?i)\s+\/grant\s+everyone" | table _time, host, user parent_*, process,
  process_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:file and directory permissions modification:windows file and directory
  permissions modification
technique_id:
- T1222.001
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/ryuk-ransomware/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.md

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TERM(icacls) OR ("/grant" "Everyone:F")

Stage 2: regex

| regex process="(?i)\s+\/grant\s+everyone"

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4688 corpus 317 (splunk 283, kusto 33, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688"
processregex_match
  • "(?i)\s+\/grant\s+everyone" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4688<"
1icacls
1"/grant"
1"Everyone:F"