Detection rules › Splunk

GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies the execution of powershell.exe with command-line arguments used to query domain groups via the Get-WmiObject cmdlet and the -class ds_group parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.

Known false positives

  • Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell
id: df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb
version: 10
creation_date: '2021-08-26'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups via the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `-class ds_group` parameter.
    This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
    This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery.
    If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    (
        `process_powershell`
        OR
        `process_cmd`
    )
    AND
    Processes.process = "*Get-WmiObject*"
    Processes.process = "*namespace *"
    Processes.process = "* root\\directory\\ldap*"
    Processes.process = "* ds_group*"
    Processes.process = "*class *"
    
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
       Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Domain group discovery enumeration via the command $process$ on $dest$ by $user$
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process
      type: command
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Discovery
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1069.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

(
    `process_powershell`
    OR
    `process_cmd`
)
AND
Processes.process = "*Get-WmiObject*"
Processes.process = "*namespace *"
Processes.process = "* root\\directory\\ldap*"
Processes.process = "* ds_group*"
Processes.process = "*class *"

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
   Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "Cmd.Exe" corpus 81 (sigma 43, elastic 21, splunk 17)
  • "PowerShell.EXE" corpus 138 (sigma 84, splunk 30, elastic 24)
  • "powershell_ise.EXE" corpus 51 (splunk 30, sigma 18, elastic 3)
  • "pwsh.dll" corpus 112 (sigma 79, splunk 30, elastic 3)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processeq
  • "* ds_group*"
  • "* root\\directory\\ldap*"
  • "*Get-WmiObject*" corpus 6 (splunk 5, sigma 1)
  • "*class *" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
  • "*namespace *" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 121 (elastic 92, splunk 29)
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 184 (elastic 140, splunk 44)
  • "powershell_ise.exe" corpus 52 (splunk 29, elastic 23)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
field:"process_name" kind:eq