Git Hooks Spawn System32 Process (Sysmon)

Group by: _time, host
Source: github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries with the help of Git hooks. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. This use case detects Git hooks spawning a System32 process. Note: for best rule fidelity, Windows Event or Sysmon process creation logs are recommended due to their detailed parent process path information. Vulnerability reference: CVE-2024-32002

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1059` Command and Scripting Interpreter

References

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation

Rule body yaml

id: '32310.57466'
title: Git Hooks Spawn System32 Process
description: 'Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands,
  scripts, or binaries with the help of Git hooks. These interfaces and languages
  provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across
  many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface
  and scripting capabilities, for example, Windows installations include the Windows
  Command Shell and PowerShell. This use case detects Git hooks spawning a System32
  process. Note: for best rule fidelity, Windows Event or Sysmon process creation
  logs are recommended due to their detailed parent process path information. Vulnerability
  reference: CVE-2024-32002'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  TERM(git) (TERM(hook) OR TERM(hooks)) "C:\\Windows\\System32" | where match(process,
  "(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32") and match(parent_process_path, "(?i)\x5cgit\x5c")
  and not match(process, "(?i)\x5c\?\?\x5cC:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconhost\.exe\s+0xffffffff\s+-ForceV1")
  | table _time, host, user, process_*, process, signature_id, parent_* | bin span=1s
  | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:command and scripting interpreter
technique_id: 
- T1059
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://amalmurali.me/posts/git-rce/
- https://github.com/amalmurali47/git_rce/tree/main
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32002

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") TERM(git) (TERM(hook) OR TERM(hooks)) "C:\\Windows\\System32"

Stage 2: `where`

| where match(process, "(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32") and match(parent_process_path, "(?i)\x5cgit\x5c") and not match(process, "(?i)\x5c\?\?\x5cC:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconhost\.exe\s+0xffffffff\s+-ForceV1")

Stage 3: `table`

| table _time, host, user, process_*, process, signature_id, parent_*

Stage 4: `bucket`

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: `stats`

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`process`	match	`"(?i)\x5c\?\?\x5cC:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cconhost\.exe\s+0xffffffff\s+-ForceV1"`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventCode`	eq	`1` corpus 237 (splunk 224, kusto 13)
`parent_process_path`	match	`"(?i)\x5cgit\x5c"` corpus 2 (splunk 2)
`process`	match	`"(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32"` corpus 3 (splunk 3)

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

Stage	Term
1	`TERM`
1	`"<EventID>1<"`
1	`TERM`
1	`git`
1	`TERM`
1	`hook`
1	`TERM`
1	`hooks`
1	`"C:\\Windows\\System32"`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Git Hooks Spawn System32 Process (Sysmon)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `table`

Stage 4: `bucket`

Stage 5: `stats`

Exclusions

Indicators

Search terms

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Git Hooks Spawn System32 Process (Sysmon)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: table

Stage 4: bucket

Stage 5: stats

Exclusions

Indicators

Search terms

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `table`

Stage 4: `bucket`

Stage 5: `stats`