Detection rules › Splunk
GitHub Enterprise Repository Archived
The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Enterprise. The detection monitors GitHub Enterprise audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1195 Supply Chain Compromise |
| Impact | T1485 Data Destruction |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- GitHub Repository Archive Status Changed (Sigma)
- GitHub Repository Archived (Panther)
- GitHub Repository Archived Or Deleted (YARA-L)
Rule body splunk
name: GitHub Enterprise Repository Archived
id: 8367cb99-bae1-4748-ae3b-0927bb381424
version: 8
creation_date: '2025-01-15'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Enterprise. The detection monitors GitHub Enterprise audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.
data_source:
- GitHub Enterprise Audit Logs
search: |-
`github_enterprise` action=repo.archived
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot,
actor_location.country_code, business, business_id,
org, org_id, repo,
repo_id, user_agent, visibility,
action
| eval user=actor
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `github_enterprise_repository_archived_filter`
how_to_implement: You must ingest GitHub Enterprise logs using Audit log streaming as described in this documentation https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-streaming-to-splunk using a Splunk HTTP Event Collector.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://www.googlecloudcommunity.com/gc/Community-Blog/Monitoring-for-Suspicious-GitHub-Activity-with-Google-Security/ba-p/763610
- https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-streaming-to-splunk
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: $user$ archived a repository in GitHub Enterprise
threat_objects:
- field: user_agent
type: http_user_agent
analytic_story:
- GitHub Malicious Activity
- NPM Supply Chain Compromise
asset_type: GitHub
mitre_attack_id:
- T1485
- T1195
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/github_archived_repository/github.json
source: http:github
sourcetype: httpevent
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`github_enterprise` action=repo.archived
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot,
actor_location.country_code, business, business_id,
org, org_id, repo,
repo_id, user_agent, visibility,
action
Stage 4: eval
| eval user=actor
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `github_enterprise_repository_archived_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
action | eq |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|