Detection rules › Splunk
GitHub Organizations Repository Archived
The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Organizations. The detection monitors GitHub Organizations audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1195 Supply Chain Compromise |
| Impact | T1485 Data Destruction |
Rule body splunk
name: GitHub Organizations Repository Archived
id: 4f568a0e-896f-4d94-a2f7-fa6d82ab1f77
version: 9
creation_date: '2025-01-15'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects when a repository is archived in GitHub Organizations. The detection monitors GitHub Organizations audit logs for repository archival events by tracking actor details, repository information, and associated metadata. For a SOC, identifying repository archival is important as it could indicate attempts to make critical code inaccessible or preparation for repository deletion. While archiving is a legitimate feature, unauthorized archival of active repositories could signal account compromise, insider threats, or attempts to disrupt development operations. The impact of unauthorized repository archival includes loss of active development access, disruption to workflows and CI/CD pipelines, and potential business delays if critical repositories are affected. Additionally, archived repositories may be targeted for subsequent deletion, potentially resulting in permanent loss of intellectual property if proper backups are not maintained.
data_source:
- GitHub Organizations Audit Logs
search: |-
`github_organizations` vendor_action=repo.archived
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot,
actor_location.country_code, business, business_id,
org, org_id, repo,
repo_id, user_agent, visibility,
vendor_action
| eval user=actor
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `github_organizations_repository_archived_filter`
how_to_implement: You must ingest GitHub Organizations logs using Splunk Add-on for Github using a Personal Access Token https://splunk.github.io/splunk-add-on-for-github-audit-log-monitoring/Install/ .
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://splunk.github.io/splunk-add-on-for-github-audit-log-monitoring/Install/
- https://www.googlecloudcommunity.com/gc/Community-Blog/Monitoring-for-Suspicious-GitHub-Activity-with-Google-Security/ba-p/763610
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: $user$ archived a repository in GitHub Organizations
threat_objects:
- field: user_agent
type: http_user_agent
analytic_story:
- GitHub Malicious Activity
- NPM Supply Chain Compromise
asset_type: GitHub
mitre_attack_id:
- T1485
- T1195
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1485/github_archived_repository/github.json
source: github
sourcetype: github:cloud:audit
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`github_organizations` vendor_action=repo.archived
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY actor, actor_id, actor_is_bot,
actor_location.country_code, business, business_id,
org, org_id, repo,
repo_id, user_agent, visibility,
vendor_action
Stage 4: eval
| eval user=actor
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `github_organizations_repository_archived_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
sourcetype | eq |
|
vendor_action | eq |
|