Detection rules › Splunk
HTTP_HTTPS Default Security Zone Modified to Local Machine (Windows Event Log)
Threat actors may Windows Registry to reconfigure the default Internet Zone settings for both HTTP and HTTPS, aligning them with the "My Computer" zone. The effectively grants websites the same level of trust as files and applications locally stored on your machine. This use case detects modifications to Windows registry settings to elevate trust levels for websites, treating them similarly to locally stored files.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Defense Impairment |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '29278.52822'
title: HTTP_HTTPS Default Security Zone Modified to Local Machine
description: Threat actors may Windows Registry to reconfigure the default Internet
Zone settings for both HTTP and HTTPS, aligning them with the "My Computer" zone.
The effectively grants websites the same level of trust as files and applications
locally stored on your machine. This use case detects modifications to Windows registry
settings to elevate trust levels for websites, treating them similarly to locally
stored files.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet
Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProtocolDefaults" (" http " OR " https ") (" /d " OR "-Value"
OR "0x00000000") | regex process="(?i)HKCU|HKEY_CURRENT_USER|HKLM|HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKU"
| regex process="(?i)\/d\s+0|\-Value\s+0|0x00000000" | table _time, host, user,
process, process_name, parent_process_name | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as *
by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:modify registry
technique_id:
- T1112
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/1699042827261391247
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProtocolDefaults" (" http " OR " https ") (" /d " OR "-Value" OR "0x00000000")
Stage 2: regex
| regex process="(?i)HKCU|HKEY_CURRENT_USER|HKLM|HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKU"
Stage 3: regex
| regex process="(?i)\/d\s+0|\-Value\s+0|0x00000000"
Stage 4: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_name, parent_process_name
Stage 5: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 6: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
process | regex_match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProtocolDefaults" |
| 1 | " http " |
| 1 | " https " |
| 1 | " /d " |
| 1 | "-Value" |
| 1 | "0x00000000" |