Detection rules › Splunk

HTTP Possible Request Smuggling

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
"http.http_method", "http.http_user_agent", "http.protocol", "http.status", "http.url", dest, destination_port, headers, src_ip
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

HTTP request smuggling is a technique for interfering with the way a web site processes sequences of HTTP requests that are received from one or more users. Request smuggling vulnerabilities are often critical in nature, allowing an attacker to bypass security controls, gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, and directly compromise other application users. This detection identifies a common request smuggling technique of using both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers to cause a parsing confusion between the frontend and backend.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body splunk

name: HTTP Possible Request Smuggling
id: 97d85f98-9d15-41a0-8682-7030454875e7
version: 5
creation_date: '2025-10-21'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: HTTP request smuggling is a technique for interfering with the way a web site processes sequences of HTTP requests that are received from one or more users. Request smuggling vulnerabilities are often critical in nature, allowing an attacker to bypass security controls, gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, and directly compromise other application users. This detection identifies a common request smuggling technique of using both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers to cause a parsing confusion between the frontend and backend.
data_source:
    - Suricata
search: |-
    `suricata` (http.request_headers{}.name="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.name="*Transfer-Encoding*") OR (http.request_headers{}.name="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.value="*Transfer-Encoding*") OR (http.request_headers{}.value="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.name="*Transfer-Encoding*") OR (http.request_headers{}.name="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.value="0")
      | rename dest_ip as dest
      | rex field=_raw "request_headers.:\[(?<headers>.*)\]"
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest, dest_port, src_ip,
           http.url, http.http_method, http.http_user_agent,
           http.protocol, http.status, headers
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `http_possible_request_smuggling_filter`
how_to_implement: This detection requires the Web datamodel to be populated from a supported Technology Add-On like Suricata, Splunk for Apache, Splunk for Nginx, or Splunk for Palo Alto. Some of these will need to have all headers dumped to contain the necessary fields.
known_false_positives: False positives are not expected, however, monitor, filter, and tune as needed based on organization log sources.
references:
    - https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling#what-is-http-request-smuggling
    - https://portswigger.net/research/http1-must-die
    - https://www.vaadata.com/blog/what-is-http-request-smuggling-exploitations-and-security-best-practices/
    - https://www.securityweek.com/new-http-request-smuggling-attacks-impacted-cdns-major-orgs-millions-of-websites/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Possible request smuggling against a web request was detected. The source IP is $src_ip$ and the destination is $dest$.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: src_ip
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - HTTP Request Smuggling
asset_type: Network
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1071.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: web
security_domain: network
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/request_smuggling/suricata_request_smuggling.log
          sourcetype: suricata
          source: not_applicable
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`suricata` (http.request_headers{}.name="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.name="*Transfer-Encoding*") OR (http.request_headers{}.name="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.value="*Transfer-Encoding*") OR (http.request_headers{}.value="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.name="*Transfer-Encoding*") OR (http.request_headers{}.name="*Content-Length*" http.request_headers{}.value="0")

Stage 2: rename

| rename dest_ip as dest

Stage 3: rex

| rex field=_raw "request_headers.:\[(?<headers>.*)\]"

Stage 4: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest, dest_port, src_ip,
       http.url, http.http_method, http.http_user_agent,
       http.protocol, http.status, headers

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `http_possible_request_smuggling_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
http.request_headers{}.nameeq
  • "*Content-Length*"
  • "*Transfer-Encoding*"
http.request_headers{}.valueeq
  • "*Content-Length*"
  • "*Transfer-Encoding*"
  • "0"
sourcetypeeq
  • suricata