Detection rules › Splunk
Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters
The following analytic identifies the use of suspicious command-line parameters associated with Impacket tools, such as wmiexec.py, smbexec.py, dcomexec.py, and atexec.py, which are used for lateral movement and remote code execution. It detects these activities by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns. This activity is significant because Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams to move laterally within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.
Known false positives
- Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
name: Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters
id: 8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af
version: 14
creation_date: '2021-11-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the use of suspicious command-line parameters associated with Impacket tools, such as `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py`, and `atexec.py`, which are used for lateral movement and remote code execution. It detects these activities by analyzing process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns. This activity is significant because Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries and Red Teams to move laterally within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = "*/Q /c * \\\\127.0.0.1\\*$*" AND Processes.process IN ("*2>&1*","*2>&1*")) by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket
- https://vk9-sec.com/impacket-remote-code-execution-rce-on-windows-from-linux/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
finding:
title: Suspicious command line parameters on $dest$ may represent a lateral movement attack with Impackets tools
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- WhisperGate
- Gozi Malware
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Volt Typhoon
- Prestige Ransomware
- Industroyer2
- Data Destruction
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Compromised Windows Host
- CISA AA22-277A
- Storm-0501 Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1021.002
- T1021.003
- T1047
- T1543.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = "*/Q /c * \\\\127.0.0.1\\*$*" AND Processes.process IN ("*2>&1*","*2>&1*")) by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.process | eq |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:eq |
Processes.process | in |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:in |
Processes.process_name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq |