Detection rules › Splunk
Invoke-DCOM.ps1 - PowerShell (Windows Event Log)
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. This use case detects the usage of Invoke-DCOM PowerShell script to remotely obtain arbitrary and direct shellcode execution through Office applications as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. Note: PowerShell logging is recommended for best detection. Detection using other log sources is dependent on commands being run in manner that creates a new process, such as powershell -c.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement | T1021.003 Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaml
id: '31900.57001'
title: Invoke-DCOM.ps1 - PowerShell
description: 'Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines
by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary
may then perform actions as the logged-on user. This use case detects the usage
of Invoke-DCOM PowerShell script to remotely obtain arbitrary and direct shellcode
execution through Office applications as well as other Windows objects that contain
insecure methods. Note: PowerShell logging is recommended for best detection. Detection
using other log sources is dependent on commands being run in manner that creates
a new process, such as powershell -c.'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ((("MMC20.Application" OR "ShellWindows" OR "ShellBrowserWindow"
OR "CheckDomain" OR "ServiceCheck" OR "MinimizeAll" OR "ServiceStop" OR "ServiceStart"
OR "DetectOffice" OR "RegisterXLL" OR "ExcelDDE") OR ("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39"
OR "C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880" OR "7e0423cd-1119-0928-900c-e6d4a52a0715"))
OR ("Application.ServiceStart" OR "Application.ServiceStop" OR "Application.IsServiceRunning"
OR "Application.ShutDownWindows" OR "Application.GetSystemInformation" OR "DDEInitiate"
OR "Application.RegisterXLL" OR "Application.ProductCode" OR "Application.MinimizeAll"
OR "ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand") ("cmd.exe" OR "powershell.exe" OR "pwsh.exe"))
AND NOT ("rundll32.exe" OR TERM(rundll32)) | table _time, host, user, process |
bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- lateral-movement:remote services:distributed component object model
technique_id:
- T1021.003
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/lateral_movement/Invoke-DCOM.ps1
- https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ((("MMC20.Application" OR "ShellWindows" OR "ShellBrowserWindow" OR "CheckDomain" OR "ServiceCheck" OR "MinimizeAll" OR "ServiceStop" OR "ServiceStart" OR "DetectOffice" OR "RegisterXLL" OR "ExcelDDE") OR ("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39" OR "C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880" OR "7e0423cd-1119-0928-900c-e6d4a52a0715")) OR ("Application.ServiceStart" OR "Application.ServiceStop" OR "Application.IsServiceRunning" OR "Application.ShutDownWindows" OR "Application.GetSystemInformation" OR "DDEInitiate" OR "Application.RegisterXLL" OR "Application.ProductCode" OR "Application.MinimizeAll" OR "ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand") ("cmd.exe" OR "powershell.exe" OR "pwsh.exe")) AND NOT ("rundll32.exe" OR TERM(rundll32))
Stage 2: table
| table _time, host, user, process
Stage 3: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 4: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
Search terms
Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | "MMC20.Application" |
| 1 | "ShellWindows" |
| 1 | "ShellBrowserWindow" |
| 1 | "CheckDomain" |
| 1 | "ServiceCheck" |
| 1 | "MinimizeAll" |
| 1 | "ServiceStop" |
| 1 | "ServiceStart" |
| 1 | "DetectOffice" |
| 1 | "RegisterXLL" |
| 1 | "ExcelDDE" |
| 1 | "9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39" |
| 1 | "C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880" |
| 1 | "7e0423cd-1119-0928-900c-e6d4a52a0715" |
| 1 | "Application.ServiceStart" |
| 1 | "Application.ServiceStop" |
| 1 | "Application.IsServiceRunning" |
| 1 | "Application.ShutDownWindows" |
| 1 | "Application.GetSystemInformation" |
| 1 | "DDEInitiate" |
| 1 | "Application.RegisterXLL" |
| 1 | "Application.ProductCode" |
| 1 | "Application.MinimizeAll" |
| 1 | "ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand" |
| 1 | "cmd.exe" |
| 1 | "powershell.exe" |
| 1 | "pwsh.exe" |
| 1 | "rundll32.exe" |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | rundll32 |