Detection rules › Splunk
ISO File in Temp Folder (Windows Event Log)
Threat actors may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This use case detects file events involving AppData Temp folder locations involving zip and ISO files, as observed with Qakbot from end of July 2022. Event 4656 and/or 4663 are required for detection. To specifically audit file creations, enable object access auditing and configure auditing on the directories \AppData\Local\Temp and AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook'
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
References
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
id: '23357.42539'
title: ISO File in Temp Folder
description: Threat actors may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order
to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open
a file that will lead to code execution. This use case detects file events involving
AppData Temp folder locations involving zip and ISO files, as observed with Qakbot
from end of July 2022. Event 4656 and/or 4663 are required for detection. To specifically
audit file creations, enable object access auditing and configure auditing on the
directories \AppData\Local\Temp and AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4656) OR
"<EventID>4656<" OR TERM(EventCode=4663) OR "<EventID>4663<") ("\\AppData\\Local\\Temp"
OR "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\Content\\Outlook") ".zip" ".iso"
| where match(process_path, "(?i)(\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cMicrosoft\x5cWindows\x5cINetCache\x5cContent\.Outlook|\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cTemp).*\.zip\x5c")
and match(ObjectName, "(?i)\.iso($|\")") | table _time, host, user, signature_id,
process, process_*, parent_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:user execution:malicious file
technique_id:
- T1204.002
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/12/09/a-closer-look-at-qakbots-latest-building-blocks-and-how-to-knock-them-down/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4656) OR "<EventID>4656<" OR TERM(EventCode=4663) OR "<EventID>4663<") ("\\AppData\\Local\\Temp" OR "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\Content\\Outlook") ".zip" ".iso"
Stage 2: where
| where match(process_path, "(?i)(\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cMicrosoft\x5cWindows\x5cINetCache\x5cContent\.Outlook|\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cTemp).*\.zip\x5c") and match(ObjectName, "(?i)\.iso($|\")")
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, signature_id, process, process_*, parent_*
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq |
ObjectName | regex_match |
| field:"ObjectName" kind:regex_match |
process_path | regex_match |
| field:"process_name" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4656<" |
| 1 | "<EventID>4663<" |
| 1 | "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp" |
| 1 | "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\Content\\Outlook" |
| 1 | ".zip" |
| 1 | ".iso" |