Detection rules › Splunk
ISO Image Mounted - Windows (Windows Event Log)
Threat actors such as APT29 have used ISO files to deliver malicious code to target systems. Normally, when a file is downloaded from the internet, Windows adds a Zone Identifier to identify the file's origin (known as mark-of-the-web or MOTW). Files stored with an ISO do not contain the Zone Identifier Alternate Data Stream, enabling MOTW bypass. This use case detects ISO images mounted on Windows systems
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Defense Impairment |
References
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-apt29-phishing-campaigns
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/bumblebee-is-still-transforming
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-quantum-locker-ransomware
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4663: An attempt was made to access an object. |
Rule body
id: '20231.35920'
title: ISO Image Mounted - Windows
description: 'Threat actors such as APT29 have used ISO files to deliver malicious
code to target systems. Normally, when a file is downloaded from the internet, Windows
adds a Zone Identifier to identify the file''s origin (known as mark-of-the-web
or MOTW). Files stored with an ISO do not contain the Zone Identifier Alternate
Data Stream, enabling MOTW bypass. This use case detects ISO images mounted on Windows
systems. -- Threat Actor Association: Lazarus -- Atomics T1553.005 Test #1'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4663) OR
"<EventID>4663<") "Device\\CdRom" | where match(file_path, "(?i)\x5cDevice\x5cCdRom")
and not match(file_path, "\x5cDevice\x5cCdRom0\x5csetup\.exe")| table _time, host,
user, process, process_*, parent_process_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as *
by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:subvert trust controls:mark-of-the-web bypass
- execution:user execution:malicious file
technique_id:
- T1553.005
- T1204.002
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-apt29-phishing-campaigns
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/bumblebee-is-still-transforming
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-quantum-locker-ransomware
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4663) OR "<EventID>4663<") "Device\\CdRom"
Stage 2: where
| where match(file_path, "(?i)\x5cDevice\x5cCdRom") and not match(file_path, "\x5cDevice\x5cCdRom0\x5csetup\.exe")
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_*
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
file_path | regex_match | "\x5cDevice\x5cCdRom0\x5csetup.exe" | excludes:file_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4663" |
file_path | regex_match |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4663<" |
| 1 | "Device\\CdRom" |