Detection rules › Splunk

Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
host, http_method, http_user_agent, phase, proxy, request, severity, src_ip, status, url
Author
Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects local file inclusion (LFI) attacks targeting Kubernetes Nginx ingress controllers. It leverages Kubernetes logs, parsing fields such as request and status to identify suspicious patterns indicative of LFI attempts. This activity is significant because LFI attacks can allow attackers to read sensitive files from the server, potentially exposing critical information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, further exploitation, and potential compromise of the Kubernetes environment.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access

Rule body

name: Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI
id: 0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-08-23'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects local file inclusion (LFI) attacks targeting Kubernetes Nginx ingress controllers. It leverages Kubernetes logs, parsing fields such as `request` and `status` to identify suspicious patterns indicative of LFI attempts. This activity is significant because LFI attacks can allow attackers to read sensitive files from the server, potentially exposing critical information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, further exploitation, and potential compromise of the Kubernetes environment.
data_source: []
search: '`kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw "^(?<remote_addr>\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?<time_local>[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?<request>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<status>\S*)\s(?<body_bytes_sent>\S*)\s\"(?<http_referer>[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?<http_user_agent>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<request_length>\S*)\s(?<request_time>\S*)\s\[(?<proxy_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?<proxy_alternative_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s(?<upstream_addr>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_length>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_time>\S*)\s(?<upstream_status>\S*)\s(?<req_id>\S*)" | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request "^(?<http_method>\S+)\s(?<url>\S+)\s" | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="high" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity, request | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`'
how_to_implement: You must ingest Kubernetes logs through Splunk Connect for Kubernetes.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://github.com/splunk/splunk-connect-for-kubernetes
    - https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/file-inclusion-vulnerabilities/
finding:
    title: Local File Inclusion Attack detected on $host$
    entity:
        field: host
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: src_ip
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - Dev Sec Ops
asset_type: Kubernetes
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1212
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: network

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`kubernetes_container_controller`

Stage 2: rex

| rex field=_raw "^(?<remote_addr>\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?<time_local>[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?<request>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<status>\S*)\s(?<body_bytes_sent>\S*)\s\"(?<http_referer>[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?<http_user_agent>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<request_length>\S*)\s(?<request_time>\S*)\s\[(?<proxy_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?<proxy_alternative_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s(?<upstream_addr>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_length>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_time>\S*)\s(?<upstream_status>\S*)\s(?<req_id>\S*)"

The parser skipped this rex command.

Stage 3: rename

| rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy

Stage 4: rex

| rex field=request "^(?<http_method>\S+)\s(?<url>\S+)\s"

Stage 5: eval

| eval phase="operate"

Stage 6: eval

| eval severity="high"

Stage 7: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity, request

Stage 8: lookup

| lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path
Lookup table
local_file_inclusion_paths
Key field
local_file_inclusion_paths as request
Output columns
['lfi_path', 'lfi_path']

Stage 9: search

| search lfi_path=yes

Stage 10: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 11: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 12: search

| `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.