Detection rules › Splunk
Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment
The following analytic detects the creation or update of a Kubernetes pod with host network attachment. It leverages Kubernetes Audit logs to identify pods configured with host network settings. This activity is significant for a SOC as it could allow an attacker to monitor all network traffic on the node, potentially capturing sensitive information and escalating privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and service disruptions, severely impacting the security and integrity of the Kubernetes environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1204 User Execution |
Rules detecting the same action
Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.
- Container With A hostPath Mount Created (Sigma)
- Creation Of Pod In System Namespace (Sigma)
- Kubernetes Anonymous User Create/Update/Patch Pods Request (Elastic)
- Kubernetes Container Created with Excessive Linux Capabilities (Elastic)
- Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod (Splunk)
- Kubernetes Ephemeral Container Added to Pod (Elastic)
- Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace (Splunk)
- Kubernetes Pod Created with a Sensitive hostPath Volume (Elastic)
Rule body splunk
name: Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment
id: cce357cf-43a4-494a-814b-67cea90fe990
version: 10
creation_date: '2024-01-30'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the creation or update of a Kubernetes pod with host network attachment. It leverages Kubernetes Audit logs to identify pods configured with host network settings. This activity is significant for a SOC as it could allow an attacker to monitor all network traffic on the node, potentially capturing sensitive information and escalating privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and service disruptions, severely impacting the security and integrity of the Kubernetes environment.
data_source:
- Kubernetes Audit
search: |-
`kube_audit` objectRef.resource=pods verb=create OR verb=update requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration=*\"hostNetwork\":true*
| fillnull
| stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups
BY kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace
objectRef.resource requestObject.kind responseStatus.code
sourceIPs{} stage user.username
userAgent verb requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration
| rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user
| `kubernetes_pod_with_host_network_attachment_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Kubernetes Audit logs. Ensure that audit logging is enabled in your Kubernetes cluster. Kubernetes audit logs provide a record of the requests made to the Kubernetes API server, which is crucial for monitoring and detecting suspicious activities. Configure the audit policy in Kubernetes to determine what kind of activities are logged. This is done by creating an Audit Policy and providing it to the API server. Use the Splunk OpenTelemetry Collector for Kubernetes to collect the logs. This doc will describe how to collect the audit log file https://github.com/signalfx/splunk-otel-collector-chart/blob/main/docs/migration-from-sck.md. When you want to use this detection with AWS EKS, you need to enable EKS control plane logging https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/control-plane-logs.html. Then you can collect the logs from Cloudwatch using the AWS TA https://splunk.github.io/splunk-add-on-for-amazon-web-services/CloudWatchLogs/.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-cluster/audit/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: Kubernetes pod with host network attachment from user $user$.
threat_objects:
- field: src_ip
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- Kubernetes Security
asset_type: Kubernetes
mitre_attack_id:
- T1204
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: network
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204/kubernetes_privileged_pod/kubernetes_privileged_pod.json
sourcetype: _json
source: kubernetes
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
search (verb="create" OR verb="update") objectRef.resource="pods" requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration="*\\\"hostNetwork\\\":true*" source="kubernetes"
Stage 2: fillnull
fillnull
Stage 3: stats
stats … AS user_groups BY kind, "objectRef.name", "objectRef.namespace", "objectRef.resource", "requestObject.kind", "responseStatus.code", "sourceIPs{}", stage, "user.username", userAgent, verb, "requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration"
Stage 4: rename
rename
Stage 5: search
search
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
objectRef.resource | eq |
|
requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | eq |
|
verb | eq |
|