Detection rules › Splunk
Linux Auditd Data Transfer Size Limits Via Split
The following analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities that involve the use of the split syscall, potentially indicating an attempt to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts. Attackers may use this technique to bypass size-based security controls, facilitating the covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the split syscall, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts, allowing security teams to intervene and prevent the unauthorized transfer of critical information from the network.
Known false positives
- Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Exfiltration |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Linux | auditd EXECVE record: Arguments supplied to the execve system call |
Rule body
name: Linux Auditd Data Transfer Size Limits Via Split
id: 4669561d-3bbd-44e3-857c-0e3c6ef2120c
version: 10
creation_date: '2024-08-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities that involve the use of the `split` syscall, potentially indicating an attempt to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts. Attackers may use this technique to bypass size-based security controls, facilitating the covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts, allowing security teams to intervene and prevent the unauthorized transfer of critical information from the network.
data_source:
- Linux Auditd Execve
search: |-
`linux_auditd` execve_command = "*split*" AND execve_command = "*-b *"
| rename host as dest
| rename comm as process_name
| rename exe as process
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY argc execve_command dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_auditd_data_transfer_size_limits_via_split_filter`
how_to_implement: To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd data, that consists of SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should be ingested and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833), which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step involves normalizing the field names to match the field names set by the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources and enhance the efficiency of data modeling. This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed
known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/deep-dive-on-persistence-privilege-escalation-technique-and-detection-in-linux-platform.html
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A [$execve_command$] event occurred on host - [$dest$] to split a file.
analytic_story:
- Linux Living Off The Land
- Linux Privilege Escalation
- Linux Persistence Techniques
- Compromised Linux Host
- Hellcat Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1030
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`linux_auditd` execve_command = "*split*" AND execve_command = "*-b *"
Stage 2: rename
| rename host as dest
Stage 3: rename
| rename comm as process_name
Stage 4: rename
| rename exe as process
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY argc execve_command dest
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `linux_auditd_data_transfer_size_limits_via_split_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
execve_command | eq |
| field:"execve_command" kind:eq |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"auditd" |