Detection rules › Splunk

Linux Auditd Data Transfer Size Limits Via Split Syscall

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
comm, dest, exe, parent_process_id, process_id, success, syscall, uid
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities that involve the use of the split syscall, potentially indicating an attempt to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts. Attackers may use this technique to bypass size-based security controls, facilitating the covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the split syscall, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts, allowing security teams to intervene and prevent the unauthorized transfer of critical information from the network.

Known false positives

  • Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Exfiltration

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Linux Auditd Data Transfer Size Limits Via Split Syscall
id: c03d4a49-cf9d-435b-86e9-c6f8c9b6c42e
version: 9
creation_date: '2024-08-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities that involve the use of the `split` syscall, potentially indicating an attempt to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts. Attackers may use this technique to bypass size-based security controls, facilitating the covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts, allowing security teams to intervene and prevent the unauthorized transfer of critical information from the network.
data_source:
    - Linux Auditd Syscall
search: |-
    `linux_auditd` type=SYSCALL comm=split OR exe= "*/split"
      | rename host as dest
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY comm exe syscall
           uid ppid pid
           success dest
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `linux_auditd_data_transfer_size_limits_via_split_syscall_filter`
how_to_implement: To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd data, that consist SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should be ingested and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833), which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step involves normalizing the field names  to match the field names set by the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources and enhance the efficiency of data modeling. This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed
known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/deep-dive-on-persistence-privilege-escalation-technique-and-detection-in-linux-platform.html
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A SYSCALL - [$comm$] event was executed on host - [$dest$] that limits the size of data transfer.
analytic_story:
    - Linux Living Off The Land
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
    - Compromised Linux Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1030
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`linux_auditd` type=SYSCALL comm=split OR exe= "*/split"

Stage 2: rename

| rename host as dest

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY comm exe syscall
       uid ppid pid
       success dest

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `linux_auditd_data_transfer_size_limits_via_split_syscall_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.