Detection rules › Splunk

Linux Auditd Preload Hijack Via Preload File

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
audit_id, current_working_directory, dest, host, match_count, reconstructed_path
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects suspicious preload hijacking via the preload file, which may indicate an attacker's attempt to intercept or manipulate library loading processes. The preload file can be used to force the loading of specific libraries before others, potentially allowing malicious code to execute or alter application behavior. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized modifications to the preload file, this analytic helps identify attempts to hijack preload mechanisms, enabling security teams to investigate and address potential threats to system integrity and security. Correlate this with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Linux Auditd Preload Hijack Via Preload File
id: c1b7abca-55cb-4a39-bdfb-e28c1c12745f
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-01-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects suspicious preload hijacking via the `preload` file, which may indicate an attacker's attempt to intercept or manipulate library loading processes.
    The `preload` file can be used to force the loading of specific libraries before others, potentially allowing malicious code to execute or alter application behavior.
    By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized modifications to the `preload` file, this analytic helps identify attempts to hijack preload mechanisms, enabling security teams to investigate and address potential threats to system integrity and security.
    Correlate this with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
data_source:
    - Linux Auditd Path
    - Linux Auditd Cwd
search: |
    `linux_auditd`
    (type=PATH OR type=CWD)
    | rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"
    
    | stats
      values(type) as types
      values(name) as names
      values(nametype) as nametype
      values(cwd) as cwd_list
      values(_time) as event_times
      by audit_id, host
    
    | eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")
    | eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))
    | eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, "/etc/ld.so.preload.*"))
    | eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)
    | eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)
    | eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)
    | where match_count > 0
    | rename host as dest
    
    | stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
      values(nametype) as nametype
      by current_working_directory
         reconstructed_path
         match_count
         dest
         audit_id
    
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_auditd_preload_hijack_via_preload_file_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd
    data, that consist SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line
    executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should be ingested
    and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833),
    which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step
    involves normalizing the field names  to match the field names set by the Splunk
    Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources
    and enhance the efficiency of data modeling and make sure the type=CWD record type is activate in your auditd configuration.
    This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed.
known_false_positives: |
    Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes.
    Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/deep-dive-on-persistence-privilege-escalation-technique-and-detection-in-linux-platform.html
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A [$nametype$] event has occurred on host - [$dest$] to modify the preload file.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - VoidLink Cloud-Native Linux Malware
    - Linux Living Off The Land
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
    - Compromised Linux Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1574.006
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1574.006/auditd_path_preload_file/path_preload.log
          source: auditd
          sourcetype: auditd
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`linux_auditd`
(type=PATH OR type=CWD)

Stage 2: rex

| rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"

Stage 3: stats

| stats
  values(type) as types
  values(name) as names
  values(nametype) as nametype
  values(cwd) as cwd_list
  values(_time) as event_times
  by audit_id, host

Stage 4: eval

| eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")

Stage 5: eval

| eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))

Stage 6: eval

| eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, "/etc/ld.so.preload.*"))

Stage 7: eval

| eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)

Stage 8: eval

| eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)

Stage 9: eval

| eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)

Stage 10: where

| where match_count > 0

Stage 11: rename

| rename host as dest

Stage 12: stats

| stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
  values(nametype) as nametype
  by current_working_directory
     reconstructed_path
     match_count
     dest
     audit_id

Stage 13: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 14: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 15: search

| `linux_auditd_preload_hijack_via_preload_file_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
match_countgt
  • 0
sourcetypeeq
  • auditd
typeeq
  • CWD
  • PATH