Detection rules › Splunk

Linux Curl Upload File

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of the curl command with specific switches (-F, --form, --upload-file, -T, -d, --data, --data-raw, -I, --head) to upload AWS credentials or configuration files to a remote destination. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive AWS credentials, a technique known to be used by the TeamTNT group. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential compromise of AWS resources.

Known false positives

  • Filtering may be required. In addition to AWS credentials, add other important files and monitor. The inverse would be to look for _all_ -F behavior and tune from there.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
LinuxEvent ID 1: Process Create

Rule body

name: Linux Curl Upload File
id: c1de2d9a-0c02-4bb4-a49a-510c6e9cf2bf
version: 13
creation_date: '2022-07-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of the curl command with specific switches (-F, --form, --upload-file, -T, -d, --data, --data-raw, -I, --head) to upload AWS credentials or configuration files to a remote destination. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process details. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive AWS credentials, a technique known to be used by the TeamTNT group. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential compromise of AWS resources.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
    - Cisco Isovalent Process Exec
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process IN ("*-F *", "*--form *","*--upload-file *","*-T *","*-d *","*--data *","*--data-raw *", "*-I *", "*--head *")
        AND
        Processes.process IN ("*.aws/credentials*". "*.aws/config*")
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_curl_upload_file_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Filtering may be required. In addition to AWS credentials, add other important files and monitor. The inverse would be to look for _all_ -F behavior and tune from there.
references:
    - https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
    - https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/curl/
finding:
    title: An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to upload important files to a remote destination.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to upload important files to a remote destination.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Linux Living Off The Land
    - Data Exfiltration
    - Ingress Tool Transfer
    - NPM Supply Chain Compromise
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1105
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process IN ("*-F *", "*--form *","*--upload-file *","*-T *","*-d *","*--data *","*--data-raw *", "*-I *", "*--head *")
    AND
    Processes.process IN ("*.aws/credentials*". "*.aws/config*")
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `linux_curl_upload_file_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.processin
  • "*--data *"
  • "*--data-raw *"
  • "*--form *"
  • "*--head *"
  • "*--upload-file *"
  • "*-F *"
  • "*-I *"
  • "*-T *"
  • "*-d *"
  • "*.aws/credentials*"."*.aws/config*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:in
Processes.process_nameeq
  • curl
field:"process_name" kind:eq value:"curl"